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Multimedia content sharing and distribution over multimedia social networks
is more popular now than ever before: we download music from Napster, share our
images on Flickr, view user-created video on YouTube, and watch peer-to-peer tele-
vision using Coolstreaming, PPLive and PPStream. Within these multimedia social
networks, users share, exchange, and compete for scarce resources such as multime-
dia data and bandwidth, and thus influence each other’s decision and performance.
Therefore, to provide fundamental guidelines for the better system design, it is
important to analyze the users’ behaviors and interactions in a multimedia social
network, i.e., how users interact with and respond to each other.
Game theory is a mathematical tool that analyzes the strategic interactions
among multiple decision makers. It is ideal and essential for studying, analyzing,
and modeling the users’ behaviors and interactions in social networking. In this
thesis, game theory will be used to model users’ behaviors in social networks and
analyze the corresponding equilibria. Specifically, in this thesis, we first illustrate
how to use game theory to analyze and model users’ behaviors in multimedia social
networks by discussing the following three different scenarios. In the first scenario,
we consider a non-cooperative multimedia social network where users in the social
network compete for the same resource. We use multiuser rate allocation social
network as an example for this scenario. In the second scenario, we consider a
cooperative multimedia social network where users in the social network cooperate
with each other to obtain the content. We use cooperative peer-to-peer streaming
social network as an example for this scenario. In the third scenario, we consider
how to use the indirect reciprocity game to stimulate cooperation among users. We
use the packet forwarding social network as an example.
Moreover, the concept of “multimedia social networks” can be applied into
the field of signal and image processing. If each pixel/sample is treated as a user,
then the whole image/signal can be regarded as a multimedia social network. From
such a perspective, we introduce a new paradigm for signal and image processing,
and develop generalized and unified frameworks for classical signal and image prob-
lems. In this thesis, we use image denoising and image interpolation as examples
to illustrate how to use game theory to re-formulate the classical signal and image
processing problems.
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Multimedia content sharing and distribution over multimedia social networks
is more popular now than ever before: we download music from Napster [3], share
our images on Flickr [2], view user-created video on YouTube [9], and watch peer-
to-peer television using Coolstreaming [133], PPLive [4] and PPStream [5]. Within
these multimedia social networks, users share, exchange, and compete for scarce
resources such as multimedia data and bandwidth, and thus influence each other’s
decision and performance. Therefore, to provide fundamental guidelines for the
better system design, it is important to analyze the users’ behaviors and interactions
in a multimedia social network, i.e., how users interact with and respond to each
other.
Unlike generic data applications, multimedia applications have time-varying
bandwidth requirements, stringent delay deadlines and dynamic characteristics. To
enable users in a multimedia social network to successfully participate in the resource
competition, the uniquely scalable and delay-sensitive characteristics of multimedia
data and the resulting impact on users viewing experiences of multimedia content
should be explicitly involved in the system design.
In multimedia social networks, users are intelligent and have the ability to
1
observe, learn, and make intelligent decisions. Since users usually belong to differ-
ent authorities and pursue different goals, they will choose the strategies that can
maximize their own payoffs. In such a case, traditional centralized optimization-
based approaches no longer work well since they only consider the efficiency of the
whole system while totally ignore the fairness among users, which is an even more
important issue in multimedia social networks. To better design the system, not
only the efficiency issue from the system designers’ perspective but also the fairness
issue from the users’ perspective should be taken into accout. Moreover, since users
in multimedia social networks are rational and thus naturally selfish, they tend to
over-claim what they may need and will not truly report their private information
if cheating can improve their payoffs. Therefore, enforcing truth-telling is crucial in
multimedia social networks.
From the above discussions, we can see that the behavior dynamics among
users in a multimedia social network are very complex. To understand the users’
complex behavior dynamics and thus lead to a better system design, game theory is a
powerful mathematical tool that analyzes the strategic interactions among multiple
decision makers [97]. It has been developed for understanding cooperation and
conflict between individuals in many fields such as economics, politics, business,
social sciences and biology. Thus, game theory is ideal and essential for studying,
analyzing, and modeling the users’ behaviors and interactions in social networking.
Recently, it draws great attentions in cognitive networking [30] [123] and multimedia
signal processing [27]. In this thesis, we will illustrate how game theory can be used
to model users’ behaviors in various multimedia social networks and analyze the
2
corresponding equilibria.
1.2 Related Works on Social Networks
A social network is a social structure made of individuals and/or organizations
called “nodes”, which are connected with each other by certain types of interdepen-
dency, such as friendship, kinship, financial exchange, conflict, trade, etc. Many
methodologies have been studied to formulate the relationships among members
at all scales, from interpersonal to international, and social network analysis be-
comes a popular topic in sociology, economics, information science and many other
disciplines.
Most of the existing works on social networks fall into the following three cat-
egories [80]: (1) social network properties, (2) social network models, (3) social net-
work dynamics and evolution. In [17] [43], the authors showed that the vertex con-
nectivities in many large networks follow a scale-free power-law distribution. Such
a property is found to be a consequence of two generic mechanisms: (i) networks
expand continuously by the addition of new vertices, and (ii) new vertices attach
preferentially to sites that are already well connected. Another important property
of social networks is the “small-world” phenomenon. As pointed out in [125] [18],
most real-world networks exhibit relatively small diameter, i.e., the networks are
highly clustered.
Besides the study of the social network properties, there are quite a lot of work
on building models for social networks. The simplest model is the random graph
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model introduced in [37], where given a number of nodes, each pair of nodes has an
identical and independent probability of being joined by an edge. However, since
it fails to match the real-world social network properties, e.g., it does not produce
power law degree distributions, this model is not realistic. A better model that can
produce power law degree distributions is the preferential attachment [38] [44] [10],
where when a new node u arrives to the network, the probability of connecting to
a node v is proportional to the degree of v. Another model that can also produce
power law degree distributions is the copying model [103], where a new node joins
the networks by uniformly creating random edges or first random choosing a node
u and then linking to u′s neighbors.
Another important research topic in the field of social network is the study of
social network dynamics and evolution where the researchers study how the social
network evolve and how information spread over the networks. Many works have
been done to investigate the dynamics and evolution of different networks, e.g.,
trendsetters selecting in viral marketing [49], inoculation targets identification in
epidemiology [92], and studying trends in blogosphere [102].
However, most of these existing works study and analyze the social networks at
the macroeconomic level, i.e., from system designer’s perspective. Few efforts have
been made to investigate the social networks at the microeconomic level, i.e., from
the users’ perspective, which is an important issue in social network analysis since
users may only care about their own objectives and their decisions greatly affect the
evolution and performance of the social networks. In this thesis, we will study and
analyze the social networks from the users’ perspective by modeling users’ behaviors
4
and interactions using game theory.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
Since users in different multimedia social networks may have different types of
interdependency, to effectively model the users’ behaviors and interactions, different
game models for different multimedia social networks should be employed. The
two most common types of users’ interdependency in multimedia social networks
are competition and cooperation, which leads to non-cooperative social networks
and cooperative social networks, respectively. In cooperative social networks, since
users are rational thus naturally selfish, they will not cooperate with others unless
cooperation can improve their own performance. Therefore, one important issue in
cooperative social networks is cooperation stimulation. Without loss of generality,
in this thesis, we first illustrate how to use game theory to analyze and model users’
behaviors in multimedia social networks by discussing the following three different
scenarios:
• In the first scenario, we consider a non-cooperative multimedia social network
where users in the social network compete for the same resource. We use
multiuser rate allocation social network [29] as an example for this scenario
and the details will be described in Chapter 3.
• In the second scenario, we consider a cooperative multimedia social network
where users in the social network cooperate with each other to obtain the con-
tent. As discussed in Chapter 4, we will use cooperative peer-to-peer streaming
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social network [34] as an example for this scenario.
• In the third scenario, we consider how to use the indirect reciprocity game
to stimulate cooperation among users. In Chapter 5, we will use the packet
forwarding social network [28] as an example.
Moreover, the concept of “multimedia social networks” can be applied into
the field of signal and image processing. Although there are seemingly no human
factors involved in the algorithmic solution in classical signal/image processing, if
we take the view that the pixels/signals of an image are forming a notion of a
“social network” to jointly interact to accomplish a common (“processing”) goal,
be it filtering, denoising, or segmentation, then the game theoretic approach can
offer new views beyond what classical methods can. This completely changes the
traditional thinking that we have to decide what a pixel does instead of simply
giving some generic rules/guidelines and let the pixels themselves interact/cooperte
to decide the best “strategy”. From such a perspective, we introduce a new paradigm
for signal and image processing, and develop generalized and unified frameworks for
classical signal and image problems. In this thesis, we use image denoising (Chapter
6) and simultaneous image denoising and interpolation (Chapter 7) as examples to
illustrate how to use game theory to re-formulate the classical signal and image
processing problems. The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.
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1.3.1 An Overview of Game Theory (Chapter 2)
Since game theory has been recognized as an important tool in studying, mod-
eling, and analyzing the interaction process among multiple decision makers, in this
chapter, we present an overview of some fundamental concepts of game theory that
will be used in this thesis.
1.3.2 Multiuser Rate Allocation Social Networks (Chapter 3)
In multiuser rate allocation problem, a set of transmitters want to transmit
the video sequences to corresponding receivers through a common channel that is
shared by all transmitters. Since the transmitters compete for the same resource, i.e.,
channel bandwidth, they form a non-cooperative social network. The key problem in
this social network is how to efficiently and fairly allocate data rate among different
users. Most of the existing optimization-based methods, such as minimizing the
weighted sum of the distortions or maximizing the weighted sum of the peak signal-
to-noise ratios (PSNRs), have their weights heuristically determined. Moreover,
those approaches mainly focus on the efficiency issue while there is no notion of
fairness. In this chapter, we address this problem by proposing a game-theoretic
framework, in which the utility function of each user is jointly determined by the
characteristics of the transmitted video sequence and the allocated bit-rate. We show
that a unique Nash equilibrium (NE), which is proportionally fair in terms of both
utility and PSNR, can be obtained, according to which the controller can efficiently
and fairly allocate the available network bandwidth to the users. Moreover, we
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propose a distributed cheat-proof rate allocation scheme for the users to converge
to the optimal NE using alternative ascending clock auction. We also show that the
traditional optimization-based approach that maximizes the weighted sum of the
PSNRs is a special case of the game-theoretic framework with the utility function
defined as an exponential function of PSNR. Finally, we show several experimental
results on real video data to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of the
proposed method.
1.3.3 Peer-to-Peer Cooperative Video Streaming Social Networks (Chap-
ter 4)
While peer-to-peer (P2P) video streaming systems have achieved promising
results, they introduce a large number of unnecessary traverse links, which con-
sequently leads to substantial network inefficiency. To address this problem and
achieve better streaming performance, we propose to enable cooperation among
group peers, which are geographically neighboring peers with large intra-group up-
load and download bandwidths. Considering the peers selfish nature, we formulate
the cooperative streaming problem as an evolutionary game and derive, for every
peer, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), which is the stable Nash equilibrium
and no one will deviate from. Moreover, we propose a simple and distributed learn-
ing algorithm for the peers to converge to the ESSs. With the proposed algorithm,
each peer decides whether to be an agent who downloads data from the peers out-
side the group or a freerider who downloads data from the agents by simply tossing
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a coin, where the probability of being a head for the coin is learned from the peers
own past payoff history. Simulation results show that the strategy of a peer con-
verges to the ESS. Compared to the traditional non-cooperative P2P schemes, the
proposed cooperative scheme achieves much better performance in terms of social
welfare, probability of real-time streaming, and video quality (source rate).
1.3.4 Cooperation Stimulation Using Indirect Reciprocity Game Mod-
eling (Chapter 5)
In social networks, since nodes generally belong to different authorities and
pursue different goals, they will not cooperate with others unless cooperation can
improve their own performance. Thus, how to stimulate cooperation among nodes in
social networks is very important. However, most of existing game-theoretic cooper-
ation stimulation approaches rely on the assumption that the interactions between
any pair of players are long-lasting. When this assumption is not true, according
to the well-known Prisoners Dilemma and the backward induction principle, the
unique Nash equilibrium (NE) is to always play non-cooperatively. In this chapter,
we propose a cooperation stimulation scheme for the scenario where the number of
interactions between any pair of players are finite. The proposed algorithm is based
on indirect reciprocity game modelling where the key concept is “I help you not
because you have helped me but because you have helped others”. We formulate
the problem of finding the optimal action rule as a Markov Decision Process (MDP)
and propose a modified value iteration algorithm to find the optimal action rule.
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Using the packet forwarding game as an example, we show that with an appropriate
cost-to-gain ratio, the strategy of forwarding the number of packets that is equal
to the reputation level of the receiver is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Fi-
nally, simulations are shown to verify the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed
algorithm.
1.3.5 Image Denoising Games (Chapter 6)
Based on the observation that every small window in a natural image has many
similar windows in the same image, the nonlocal denoising methods perform denois-
ing by weighted averaging all the pixels in a nonlocal window and have achieved
very promising denoising results. However, the use of a fixed square neighborhood
window greatly limits the denoising performance. Therefore, an important issue
in pixel-domain image denoising algorithms is how to adaptively choose optimal
neighborhoods. Obviously, too large a neighborhood set may cause overly-smooth
artifacts, while too small a neighborhood set may not be able to efficiently reduce
the noise variance. While the Stein’s principle is shown to be able to estimate the
true mean square error (MSE) for determining the optimal neighborhoods, there
exists a trade-off between the accuracy of the estimate and the minimum of the
true MSE. In this chapter, we study the impact of such a trade-off and formulate
the image denoising problem as a coalition formation game. In this game, every
pixel is treated as a player, who tries to seek partners to form a coalition to achieve
better denoising results. By forming a coalition, every player in the coalition can
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obtain certain gains by improving the accuracy of the Stein’s estimate, while incur-
ring some costs by increasing the minimum of the true MSE. Moreover, we show
that the traditional approaches using a heuristically determined neighborhood set
are special cases of the proposed game theoretical framework by choosing the utility
function without a cost term. Finally, experimental results show that the proposed
game theoretic approach can achieve better performance than the nonlocal method
in terms of both PSNR and visual quality.
1.3.6 Simultaneous Image Denoising and Interpolation Using Evolu-
tionary Games (Chapter 7)
While the existing image interpolation approaches can achieve promising in-
terpolation results, they are specially designed for the clean images. However, when
the low resolution image is noisy, most of the existing interpolation approaches will
also boost the noise and introduces severe visual distortions. Therefore, to achieve
better reconstruction, we should jointly consider image denoising and interpola-
tion. In this chapter, we study the problem of simultaneous image denoising and
interpolation from the game theoretic perspective and formulate the problem as an
evolutionary game. In this evolutionary game, the players are the unknown high
resolution pixels and the pure strategies of the players are the corresponding noisy
low resolution neighbors. By regarding the non-negative weights of the noisy low
resolution pixels as the probabilities of selecting the pure strategies, the problem
of estimating the high resolution pixels becomes finding the evolutionarily stable
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strategies for the evolutionary game. Experimental results show that the proposed
game theoretical approach can achieve better performance than the methods that
first denoise the noisy low resolution image and then interpolate the denoised image,
in terms of both PSNR and visual quality.
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Chapter 2
An Overview of Game Theory
Game theory [97] is a mathematical tool that analyzes the strategic interac-
tions among multiple decision makers. Its history dates back to 1944 when J. von
Neumann and O. Morgenstern publish the book Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. In this book, von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced the method
of finding mutually consistent solutions for two-person zero-sum games, which lays
the foundation of game theory. During the late 1940s, cooperative game theory
had been studied to analyze how groups of individuals should cooperate with each
other to improve their positions in a game. In early 1950s, J. Nash developed an
important criterion, known as Nash equilibrium, to characterize mutually optimal
strategies of players. This concept is applicable to non-zero-sum games, and thus
is more general than the criterion proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern and
marks a quantum leap forward in the development of non-cooperative game theory.
During the 1950s, many important concepts of game theory were developed, such as
the concepts of the core, the extensive form games, repeated games, and the Shapley
value. Refinement of Nash equilibriums and the concepts of complete information
and Bayesian games were proposed in the 1960s. Application of game theory to biol-
ogy, i.e., the evolutionary game theory, was introduced by J. M. Smith in the 1970s,
during which time, the concepts of correlated equilibrium and common knowledge
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were introduced by R. Aumann. In nowadays, game theory has been widely rec-
ognized as an important tool in many fields, such as economics, politics, business,
social sciences, biology, computer science, and engineering, for understanding co-
operation and conflict between individuals. In this chapter, we will present a brief
overview on some fundamental concepts of game theory that will be used in this
thesis to model and analyze users’ behaviors and interaction in multimedia social
networks. For more extensive concepts of game theory, the readers are referred to.
2.1 Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Optimality
A strategic game 〈N, (Ai), (ui)〉 consists of three components: a set of players,
denoted by N ; a set of actions, denoted by Ai for player i; and payoff functions,
denoted by ui : A → R for player i, where A = ×i∈NAi is the action set of all
players. Generally, one player’s payoff depends on not only his/her own action,
but also other players’ actions, and hence there is a strategic interaction between
players.
Nash equilibrium is the key concept to understand non-cooperative game the-
ory. Informally speaking, it is an equilibrium where everyone plays the best strategy
while taking others’ decisions into account. Mathematically, a? is a Nash equilibrium





−i) ≥ ui(ai, a?−i), ∀ai ∈ Ai, (2.1)
where ai denotes the strategy of player i and a−i is a common notation in game
theory representing the strategies of all players other than player i. Therefore, Nash
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equilibrium predicts the outcome of a game when all players are rational. Depending
on whether players choose a single action or randomize over a set of actions according
to some probability distribution, an equilibrium can be classified as the pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium or the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Pareto optimality is a strategy profile at which no single player can improve
his/her own payoff without hurting any other player. Specifically, let u be a vector
composed of payoffs in one particular game outcome. Then, u is Pareto efficient if
there is no u′ of another game outcome for which u′i > ui for all i ∈ N ; u is strongly
Pareto efficient if there is no u′ for which u′i ≥ ui for all i ∈ N and u′i > ui for some
i ∈ N . The Pareto frontier is defined as the set of all u that are Pareto efficient.
2.2 Auction Games
Auction theory [77] is an applied branch of game theory which analyzes inter-
actions in auction markets. An auction, conducted by an auctioneer, is a process
of buying and selling products by eliciting bids from potential buyers (i.e., bidders)
and deciding the auction outcome based on the bids and auction rules. The rules of
auction, or auction mechanisms, determine whom the goods are allocated to (i.e.,
the allocation rule) and how much they have to pay (i.e., the payment rule).
The well-known four basic forms of auctions are: English auction, Dutch auc-
tion, Second-price (sealed-bid) auction, and First-price (sealed-bid) auction. English
auction is a sequential auction where price increases round by round from a low
starting price until only one bidder is left, who wins the product and pays his/her
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bid. Dutch auction is another sequential auction where price decreases round by
round from a high starting price until one bidder accepts the price, who wins the
product and pays the price at acceptance. Second-price (sealed-bid) auction is the
auction where each bidder submits a bid in a sealed envelope simultaneously, and
the highest bidder wins the product with payment equal to the second highest bid.
First-price (sealed-bid) auction is the auction where each bidder submits a bid in
a sealed envelope simultaneously, and the highest bidder wins the product with
payment equal to his/her own bid.
Although the four basic auctions appear quite different at first glance, they
are actually equivalent in some sense under certain conditions [119]. As established
in [119] by William Vickrey, a Nobel laureate in Economics, the English auction
is equivalent to the second-price sealed-bid auction under the private values model
while the Dutch auction is equivalent to the first-price sealed-bid auction since for
every strategy in the first-price auction, there is an equivalent strategy in the Dutch
auction and vice versa; and given symmetric and risk-neutral bidders and private
values, all four auctions yield the same expected revenue of the seller. Therefore, it
will suffice to study or adopt only one kind of auction out of the four basic forms.
An auction becomes more complicated when more than one item are simul-
taneously sold and bidders bid for “packages” of products instead of individual
products. This is known as the combinatorial auction [40]. One possible approach
is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is the generalized version
of the second-price mechanism. The basic idea is that the allocation of products
maximizes the social welfare and each winner in the auction pays the opportunity
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cost that their presence introduces to all the other bidders. Another approach is
the alternative ascending clock auction proposed in [16], where the basic idea is to
awarded the items to bidders at the price whenever they are “clinched”.
2.3 Evolutionary Games
In some games, there can be more than one Nash equilibrium. When there ex-
ist multiple Nash equilibria, one interesting and important problem is how to choose
an optimal one in some sense. This process is also known as “equilibria refinement”
in game theory. In the literature, several refinement criteria have been proposed,
e.g. Pareto optimality is defined to compare multi-dimension payoff profiles. How-
ever, the establishment of Pareto optimality is based on the assumption that players
have the full knowledge of the game they are playing and others players’ actions,
and that players are rational and willing to cooperate in their moves. Nevertheless,
this assumption may not be true since players may only have limited information
about the other players strategies. Moreover, players may take out-of-equilibrium
strategies due to the uncertainty of the game and incorrect/noisy estimate of others’
strategies. To overcome such problems, we need to provide a robust stable equilib-
rium, and evolutionary game theory is such a theory that can provide the desired
stable equilibrium – evolutionarily stable strategy.
Evolutionary game theory is an application of the mathematical theory of
games to the interaction dependent strategy evolution in populations [110] [41].
Arising from the realization that frequency dependent fitness introduces a strategic
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aspect to evolution, evolutionary game theory becomes an essential component of
a mathematical and computational approach to biological contexts, such as genes,
viruses, cells, and humans. Recently, however, evolutionary game theory has become
of increased interest to economists, sociologists, anthropologists, social scientists,
and computer science.
Differs from classical game theory, evolutionary game theory focuses on the
dynamics of strategy change more than the properties of strategy equilibria. It can
tell us how a rational player should behave to approach a best strategy against a
small number of players who do not follow the best strategy, and thus evolutionary
game theory can better handle the unpredictable behavior of players.
2.4 Coalition Formation Games
The coalition formation game is one type of cooperative game [104], which
describes how a set of players can cooperate with others by forming cooperating
groups and thus improves their payoffs in a game.
A coalition S is a nonempty subset of N , the set of all players. Since the
players in coalition S have agreed to cooperate together, they can be viewed as one
entity and is associated with a value v(S) which represents the worth of coalition
S. Then, a coalitional game is determined by N and v(S). When the value v(S) is
the total payoff that can be distributed in any way among the members of S, e.g.,
using an appropriate fairness rule, this kind of coalitional games is known as games
with transferrable payoff. However, in some coalitional games, rigid restrictions exist
18
on the allocation of the payoff. These games fall into the other category known as
games without transferrable payoff.
In coalition formation games, often the value v(S) is determined by two terms:
the gain of forming a coalition g(S) and the cost of forming a coalition c(S), i.e.
v(S) = g(S)− c(S). (2.2)
In general, cooperation by forming larger coalitions is beneficial for players in







≥ g(S1) + g(S2), ∀S1, S2 ⊂ N, S1
⋂
S2 = ∅. (2.3)
However, on the other hand, forming a larger coalition also require a larger







≥ c(S1) + c(S2), ∀S1, S2 ⊂ N, S1
⋂
S2 = ∅. (2.4)
Therefore, forming larger coalitions are not always beneficial due to the cost
term, which means that grand coalition is seldom formed. The objective of coalition
formation games is to find the optimal coalition structure S? = {S?1 , S?2 , ..., S?l },
S?1 ∪ S?2 ∪ ... ∪ S?l = N , that maximizes the total coalition values, i.e.,






We have discussed various games, but generally speaking, players are assumed
to face the same stage game at each time, meaning the game and the players’
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strategies are not depending on the current state of the network. However, this is
not true for a dynamic environment where players’ strategies keep changing over
time. In order to study the cooperation and competition behaviors under such a
dynamic environment, the theory of stochastic games might be a better fit.
A stochastic game [108] is an extension of Markov decision process (MDP) [101]
by considering the interactive competition among different agents. In a stochas-
tic game, there is a set of states, denoted by S, and a collection of action sets,
A1, · · · , A|N |, one for each player in the game. The game is played in a sequence
of stages. At the beginning of each stage the game is in a certain state. After the
players select and execute their actions, the game then moves to a new random
state with some transition probability determined by the current state and actions
from all players: T : S × A1 × · · · × A|N | 7→ PD(S). Meanwhile, at each stage
each player receives a payoff ui : S × A1 × · · · × A|N | 7→ R, which also depends on
the current state and all the chosen actions. The game is played continually for a
number of stages, and each player attempts to maximize an objective function. Like
in the repeated game, the overall payoff function is defined as the expected sum of
discounted intermediate payoffs.
The solution, also called a policy of a stochastic game is defined as a probability
distribution over the action set at any state, πi : S → PD(Ai), for all i ∈ N . Given
the current state st at time t, if player i’s policy πti at time t is independent of the
states and actions in all previous time slots, the policy πi is said to be Markov. If
the policy is further independent of time, it is said to be stationary.
The stationary policy of the players in a stochastic game, i.e., their optimal
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strategies, can be obtained by value iteration according to Bellman’s optimality
condition. For example, in a two-player stochastic game with opposite objectives,
let us denote V (s) as the expected reward (of player 1) for the optimal policy
starting from state s, and Q(s, a1, a2) as the expected reward of player 1 for taking
action a1 against player 2 who takes action a2 from state s and continuing optimally
thereafter [85]. Then, the optimal strategy for player 1 can be obtained from the
following iterations,






Q(s, a1, a2)πa1 , (2.6)
Q(s, a1, a2) = u1(s, a1, a2) + δ
∑
s′∈S
T (s, a1, a2, s
′)V (s′), (2.7)
where πa1 denotes player 1’s strategy profile, and T (s, a1, a2, s
′) denotes the transi-
tion probability from state s to s′ when player 1 takes a1 and player 2 takes a2.
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Chapter 3
Multiuser Rate Allocation Social Networks
Nowadays, due to the explosive growth of the Internet and the advance of
compression technologies, delay-sensitive multimedia networking applications such
as multimedia streaming and multi-camera surveillance become more and more pop-
ular. Therefore, a fundamental problem in these applications, how to fairly and effi-
ciently allocate the rate among many users who share the same network bandwidth,
becomes more and more important and draws great attention recently.
Rate allocation for a single user has been well investigated in the literature
[39] [35] [48]. In single-user rate allocation, the task of the rate controller is to assign
the available rate to each frame and each macroblock (MB) to achieve the maximal
visual quality. This is also known as rate control. The simplest rate control method
is the constant bit-rate allocation (CBR), which equally allocates the bit-rate to each
frame. However, CBR often results in quality fluctuation, due to which the overall
visual quality is significantly degraded. To overcome this problem, variable bit-rate
allocation (VBR) is proposed for constant quality reconstruction by assigning rate
according to the complexity of each frame [78]. A core technique in VBR-based
rate control methods is rate distortion modelling [64], which highly affects the rate
control performance. Many works have been done on rate distortion modelling,
including parametric method [137] and non-parametric method [134].
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If a channel is shared by multiple users, besides considering the rate allocation
within the same user (i.e., frame-level rate allocation and MB-level rate allocation),
the rate controller needs to consider the rate allocation among different users. This
becomes the multi-user rate allocation problem. Similar to frame-level rate allo-
cation, the simplest multi-user rate allocation is the constant bit-rate allocation
(CBR), where the available network bandwidth is equally assigned to each user. A
major problem of CBR is that it does not consider the variable bit-rate characteris-
tics of the video sequences. One way to overcome this disadvantage is to optimize a
global objective function that involves the characteristics of all the video sequences
using conventional optimization methods such as Lagrangian or dynamic program-
ming [95]. For example, a commonly adopted method is for the rate controller to
minimize the weighted sum of the distortions or try to maximize the weighted sum

















Ri ≤ R, (3.2)
where R is the available network bandwidth, wi is the weight, Di is the distortion,
and PSNRi is the PSNR of the i
th user.
Notice that the solution to the above optimization-based methods is highly re-
lated to the selection of the weights wi. However, in the literature, the weights wi’s
are usually heuristically determined, e.g., wi is uniformly set to be 1/N [109]. More-
over, such a formulation can only address the efficiency issue, e.g., how to maximize
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the weighted sum of the PSNRs or minimize the weighted sum of the distortions. As
such, the fairness issue, which is an important problem for multi-user rate allocation,
has been generally ignored in the image/video/multimedia community.
However, in the networking literature, the fairness issue in multi-user rate
allocation have been considered in a different setting. In [105], the authors formu-
lated the optimal channel-assignment problem as a convex optimization problem
using a max-min fairness criterion for the downlink application. As pointed out
in [61], the max-min approach deals with the worst-cast scenario, so it favors users
with worse channels and reduces the system efficiency. To overcome the disadvan-
tage, the authors in [61] considered a generalized proportional fairness based on the
Nash bargaining solutions and coalitions. While this proportional fairness criterion
was successfully employed in networking applications, it cannot be directly used in
content-aware multimedia applications since it does not explicitly consider the char-
acteristics of the video content and the resulting impact on video quality. In [98],
the authors applied the Nash bargaining solutions to the multimedia multi-user rate
allocation problem, where the utility function for each user is defined as the inverse
of the distortion. But there are two main drawbacks of that utility function. Firstly,
since no cost in video transmission is considered, every user can overclaim his/her
need to get more bandwidth regardless the consequence to the system, which is
recognized as selfish behavior. Due to the selfish nature, without a cost, all users
will become too greedy and want to get as much bit-rate as possible, which is not
good to the system [106]. Secondly, since the gain is defined as the inverse of the
distortion, i.e., an exponential function of the PSNR, a certain increase of the bit-
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rate in the low PSNR region will lead to a less significant gain than that in the high
PSNR region. This contradicts with the human visual system (HVS) model since
the quality difference in the low PSNR region is easier to be distinguished than that
in the high PSNR region (see Section 3.1.3 for details). Moreover, with the utility
function defined in [98], the generalized Nash bargaining solution is shown to be the
same as the traditional optimization-based approach in (3.2), i.e., to maximize the
weighted sum of the PSNRs, while the weights are determined by the bargaining
powers, which are still heuristically determined.
In this chapter, we propose a multi-user rate allocation game framework to
efficiently and fairly allocate the available network bandwidth to different multime-
dia users. The utility/payoff function of each user/player is defined according to
the characteristics of the transmitted video sequences and the allocated bit-rate.
Specifically, motivated by the intuition that the quality difference in the low PSNR
region is easier to be distinguished than that in the high PSNR region, we define
the gain as a logarithm function of the PSNR. We also introduce a cost term in
the utility function, which is linear in the allocated rate, to guide users’ behaviors.
In this way, the users will be more rational in choosing bit-rate since transmitting
data with a higher bit-rate in this case does not necessarily result in a higher payoff,
especially when the transmitted video sequence is a fast motion and complex scene
sequence. Then, we discuss the Nash equilibrium (NE) of this rate allocation game.
We show that with a unique NE, which is proportionally fair in terms of both utility
and PSNR, can be obtained, based on which the rate controller can efficiently and
fairly allocate the available rate. Moveover, we propose a decentralized cheat-proof
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rate allocation scheme for the users to converge to the unique NE using alternative
ascending clock auction [16]. We also show that the traditional optimization-based
method in (3.2) is a special case of the game-theoretic framework if the utility func-
tion is defined as an exponential function of PSNR. This fact indicates that the
game-theoretic approach offers a more general and unified solution, especially in a
multi-user setting. Finally, we illustrate several experimental results on real video
data to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed game-theoretic
multi-user multimedia rate allocation method.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we give a
detailed description on the proposed method, including the system model, how
to define the utility function, and the problem formulation. In Section 3.2, we
provide a detailed analysis of the proposed game-theoretic framework. In Section
3.3, we show the relationship between the proposed game-theoretic method and the
traditional optimization-based approach. In Section 3.4, we describe in details the
proposed distributed cheat-proof rate allocation scheme using alternative ascending
clock auction. Finally, we illustrate the experimental results on real video signals in
Section 3.5 and draw conclusions in Section 3.6.
3.1 The Game-Theoretic Framework
3.1.1 System Model
As shown in Figure 3.1, in our system, we assume that there is a controller,


























Figure 3.1: System Model.
the video sequence vi to the corresponding receiver ri through a channel/link that
is shared by other users u1, ..., ui−1, ui+1, ..., uN . Since the channel has a limited
bandwidth, it may not be able to satisfy the bandwidth requirements for all users.
The role of the controller is to allocate the channel bandwidth to users u1, u2, ...,
uN . So, the question is how the controller allocates the bandwidth to the users in
an efficient and fair way? We will formally define the notion of fairness later.
3.1.2 Video Distortion-Rate Model
Before answering the question raised in the above subsection, let us first discuss
the Distortion-Rate (DR) model for the video sequences. In video compression,
due to the quantization process, there exists a tradeoff between the distortion (D),
which is usually defined as the mean squared error (MSE), and bit-rate (R), which
determines the channel bandwidth or storage space required to transmit or store
the coded data. Generally, high bit-rate leads to small distortion while low bit-rate
causes large distortion. In the literature, several models have been proposed to
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characterize this distortion rate tradeoff for different video coders, such as MPEG2
[63] [48], MPEG4 [39] [35], FGS [46], H.263 [114], H.264 [31] [83], and wavelet-based
coders [124]. Without loss of generality, in this chapter, we use a simple two-
parameter distortion-rate model, which is widely employed in a medium or high
bit-rate situation, and other models can be similarly analyzed. The two-parameter
distortion-rate model is described as follows:
D(R) = αe−βR, (3.3)
where α and β are two positive parameters determined by the characteristics of the
video content.
3.1.3 User’s Utility Function
As shown in Figure 3.1, user ui can get gain by successfully transmitting the
video vi to receiver ri, and the gain is determined by the quality of the transmitted
video. On the other hand, user ui needs to pay for the used bandwidth to transmit
vi, and the payment is determined by the bit-rate of vi. Therefore, given the profile
of ui, the bit-rate Ri and distortion Di, the utility function of user ui can be defined
as:
Ui(Ri, Di) = f(Di)− ag(Ri). (3.4)
where f(Di) is the gain, g(Ri) is the cost, and a is a parameter controlling the balance
between the gain and cost.
Generally, since the gain of ui will be larger if the distortion Di is smaller,
the function f(.) should be a monotonically decreasing function. Similarly, since the
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cost of ui will be larger if the bit-rate Ri is larger, the function g(.) should be a
monotonically increasing function. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
cost per bit-rate unit is one, which means:
g(Ri) = Ri. (3.5)
The gain f(Di) is generally determined by how much receiver ri is satisfied with
the received video. In video processing and coding community, the PSNR is a more
common objective quality measure than MSE. For any MSE, i.e., the distortion D,
the corresponding PSNR is given by:




Moreover, according to the human visual system (HVS) model, the quality
difference in the low PSNR region is easier to be distinguished than that in the high
PSNR region, e.g., as shown in Figure 3.2, the 33dB and 34dB images are easier
to be distinguished than the 40dB and 41dB images. Therefore, we define the f(.)
function as:




Note that the reason of using ln(.) function is that ln(.) is a monotonically
increasing function in its argument and its second order derivative is negative, due
to which a certain increase in the low PSNR region will lead to a more significant
gain than that in the high PSNR region. Other functions that have similar properties
can also be used. Moreover, if we do not consider the distinct characteristics of video
signals, any monotonically decreasing function of the distortion D can be used, e.g.,




Figure 3.2: The visual quality of Foreman sequence at different PSNR level: (a)
33dB; (b) 34dB; (c) 40dB; (d) 41dB.
or




Combining (3.3)-(3.7) and ignoring the constant term, the utility function of
user ui becomes:
Ui(Ri) = ln(γi + βiRi)− aRi. (3.10)
where γi = 2 ln 255− ln αi.
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3.1.4 Multi-User Rate Allocation Game
To answer the question raised in Section 3.1.1, we formulate this problem as
a multi-user rate allocation game. As shown in Figure 3.1, in this game, there are
N users/players, who share the available network bandwidth with each other. Each
user ui has his/her own utility function as shown in (3.10), and it also has a minimum
desired quality constraint (minimal rate constraint Rmini ) and a maximum satisfied
quality constraint (maximum rate constraint Rmaxi ). Since R
min
i is the minimal
rate constraint that each user expects by jointing in the game, we assume that the
available network rate at least guarantees each user for the minimal desired rate
in the game. Obviously, if the available network bandwidth is able to satisfy all
the users with the maximum quality constraint Rmaxi , the rate allocation problem
is trivial since the controller just needs to allocate Rmaxi to each user ui. However,
in the case that the available network bandwidth is not able to satisfy all the user
with Rmaxi , the problem becomes more interesting: how does the controller fairly
and efficiently allocate the available bandwidth to the users? From the users’ point
of view, they try to maximize their utilities subject to the constraint that the sum
of the users’ bit-rate does not exceed the available bandwidth. Therefore, the game
can be formulated as:
max
Ri
Ui(Ri) = ln(γi + βiRi)− aRi,
s.t. Rmini ≤ Ri ≤ Rmaxi , ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N,
N∑
i=1
Ri ≤ R, (3.11)
where R is the available network bandwidth.
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3.2 Analysis of The Multi-User Rate Allocation Game
According to (3.10), we can see that the utility function Ui(Ri) is a concave






− a, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N. (3.12)
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, Rmaxi )], ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N. (3.13)
From (3.13), we can see that the optimal R?i corresponding to the maximal
utility is determined by the parameter a. Therefore, for different choices of a, the
game in (3.11) has different equilibria with different physical meanings. Specifically,
in the following, we discuss the Nash equilibrium (NE) in three different cases:













3.2.1 Non-Efficient Rate Allocation (a > a0)











i < R, which means that the available
network bandwidth is not fully utilized. Therefore, this allocation scheme is not
efficient.
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3.2.2 Efficient Rate Allocation (0 ≤ a < a0)
If 0 ≤ a < a0, the game in (3.11) has infinitely many NE. For every NE
(R̃1, R̃2, ..., R̃N), according to Lemma 1, we have
∑N
i=1 R̃i = R, which means that
the available network bandwidth is fully utilized. Therefore, this allocation scheme
is efficient.
Lemma 1: When 0 ≤ a < a0, every NE (R̃1, R̃2, ..., R̃N) satisfies
∑N
i=1 R̃i = R.
Proof: Since
∑N
i=1 R̃i ≤ R, let us assume that there is a NE (R̃1, R̃2, ..., R̃N)
such that
∑N




i > R, which
means there exists at least one R̃j such that R̃j < R
?





i=1 R̃i + R̂j +
∑N
i=j+1 R̃i ≤ R and Uj(R̂j) > Uj(R̃j) (due to the concavity of
the utility function). This contradicts with the assumption that (R̃1, R̃2, ..., R̃N) is
a NE. Therefore,
∑N
i=1 R̃i = R. This completes the proof.
3.2.3 Efficient and Proportionally Fair in Both Utility and PSNR
(a = a0)











i = R, which means that the available network
bandwidth is fully utilized. Therefore, this allocation scheme is efficient.
Moreover, we will show in the following definition [72] and theorem that when






N) is a proportionally fair NE in terms of both utility and
PSNR.
Definition 1: A utility distribution is said to be proportionally fair when any
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≤ 0, ∀Ui ∈ S. (3.15)
where Ũi and Ui are the proportionally fair utility and any other feasible utility for
the ith user, respectively, and S is a closed and convex subset of <N to represent the
set of feasible utility functions that the users can achieve.
Remark: The definition of proportional fairness comes from the fact that, if
(Ũ1, Ũ2, ..., ŨN) satisfies (3.15), any deviation from (Ũ1, Ũ2, ..., ŨN) will lead to a non-
increasing sum of the proportional changes. Moreover, from [72] and [61], we can see





for any feasible (U1, U2, ..., UN).






N) is a proportionally fair NE in terms
of both utility and PSNR.




N) is a proportionally fair









[ln(γi + βiRi)− aRi]
s.t. Rmini ≤ Ri ≤ Rmaxi , ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N,
N∑
i=1











s.t. Rmini ≤ Ri ≤ Rmaxi , ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N,
N∑
i=1
Ri ≤ R. (3.17)
• We first show that (R?1, R?2, ..., R?N) is a proportionally fair NE in terms of




i ) at R
?
i , we have
Ui(R
?
i ) ≥ Ui(Ri), for any Ri satisfies Rmini ≤ Ri ≤ Rmaxi and
∑N












N) is a proportionally fair NE in terms of utility.
• We then show that (R?1, R?2, ..., R?N) is a proportionally fair NE in terms of
PSNR. Since maximizing
∏
i xi is the same as maximizing
∑
i ln(xi), the opti-






s.t. Rmini ≤ Ri ≤ Rmaxi , ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N,
N∑
i=1
Ri ≤ R, (3.18)
Since the above optimization problem is convex, the optimal solution can be
found by solving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [19]. We first
write the Lagrangian of problem (3.18) as:
L(Ri, λ, κi, νi) = −
N∑
i=1














Then, the KKT conditions are:
− βi
γi + βiRi




Ri −R) = 0;
κi(Ri −Rmaxi ) = 0; ∀i = 1, ..., N.
νi(R
min
i −Ri) = 0; ∀i = 1, ..., N.




λ ≥ 0, κi ≥ 0, νi ≥ 0; ∀i = 1, ..., N. (3.20)























N) is the solution to the optimization problem in
(3.17), which means that it is a proportionally fair NE in terms of PSNR.






N) is a proportionally fair NE in terms of both
utility and PSNR. This completes the proof.
Remark: From the above analysis, we can see that choosing a = a0 is the
best among the three different cases due to the following four reasons: (1) a unique
proportionally fair NE in terms of both utility and PSNR can be found when a = a0;
(2) with the unique proportionally fair NE, the available network bandwidth will be
fully utilized; (3) since the optimal solution shown in (3.21) is very simple, no opti-
mization is needed and the computational complexity is low; and (4) a distributed
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algorithm can be designed for the users to converge to the unique NE which will
discussed in Section 3.4.
3.3 Relation To The Traditional Optimization-Based Approach
While the task of rate allocation for a single user is to find the best trade-off
point on the rate-distortion curve, the traditional optimization-based multi-user rate
allocation approach can be seen as first constructing an overall rate-distortion curve
by combining rate-distortion curves of all users, and then finding the best trade-
off point on the joint rate-distortion curve. However, it is difficult to construct
the overall rate-distortion curve from all users’ rate-distortion curve. The approach
shown in (3.2) is one possible way, but there is no notion of fairness. Furthermore,
the weights in (3.2) are hard to determine and are usually defined heuristically.
Instead of focusing on finding a good way of constructing the overall rate-
distortion curve, the proposed game-theoretic framework considers each user’s rate-
distortion trade-off in the utility function. Then, the notion of proportional fairness,
is introduced to balance the rate allocation among different users and to make sure
that the total rate constraint is satisfied. Moreover, from (3.2), (3.4), and (3.16), we
can see that the traditional optimization-based approach shown in (3.2) is actually a
special case of the proposed game-theoretic framework by choosing the gain function
and the cost function as follows:
f(Di) = e
wiPSNRi , g(Ri) = 0, (3.22)
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which means,
Ui(Ri, Di) = e
wiPSNRi . (3.23)
Note that there are mainly three drawbacks of this kind of utility function:
• The parameters wi are usually heuristically determined.
• If no cost in video transmission is considered, selfish users may become too
greedy and want to get as much bit-rate as possible, which is not good to the
system [106].
• Since the gain is defined as an exponential function of the PSNR, a certain
increase of the bit-rate in the low PSNR region will lead to a less significant
gain than that in the high PSNR region. This contradicts with the human
visual system (HVS) model since the quality difference in the low PSNR region
is easier to be distinguished than that in the high PSNR region.
3.4 Clock Auction For Distributed Cheat-Proof Optimal Rate Allo-
cation
In Section 3.2, we have discussed the NE of the multi-user rate allocation
game for different a’s and found that, when a = a0, the game has a proportionally
fair NE in both utility and PSNR. However, we have not discussed how to obtain
a0 and how the users converge to the NE yet. There are two possible approaches,
centralized approach and distributed approach. For the centralized approach, the




and Rmaxi . Then, the controller can first find a0 in a collective way by solving (3.14)
and then allocate R?i to ui.
However, in general, the users can be geographically distributed in many
places, it is therefore not feasible for the controller to collect all the private informa-
tion of each user. Moreover, since the users are selfish, e.g., they tend to overclaim
what they may need, they will not truly report their private information if cheating
can improve their utilities [62]. To solve this problem, we propose a distributed
cheat-proof rate allocation scheme using alternative ascending clock auction [16].
An auction is a decentralized mechanism for allocating resources, where there is an
auctioneer and several bidders. The auction processes can be described as follows:
the auctioneer announces a price, bidders report to the auctioneer their demands
at that price, and the auctioneer raises the price until the total demand meets the
supply. In our multi-user rate allocation problem, the controller is the auctioneer
and the users are the bidders.
The proposed rate allocation scheme is described in Algorithm 1. As shown
in Algorithm 1, before the auction, the controller sets up the step size δ > 0, clock
index t = 0, and initializes a with a small value a0. At the beginning of clock t,
the controller first announces at to all the users. Then, each user submits his/her
optimal demand to the controller. After collecting all the demands, the controller
compares the total demand Rtotal with the available bandwidth R. If Rtotal > R, i.e.,
the total demand exceeds the supply, the auction is not concluded. The controller
continues the auction and goes to next clock t + 1 with an increased a computed
by at+1 = at + δ. Moreover, the controller computes the cumulative clinch, which is
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the amount of bit-rate that a user is guaranteed to win at current clock given by




On the other hand, if Rtotal ≤ R, then the supply can meet all users’ demands
and the auction is concluded. Let the final clock index be L. As a increases dis-
cretely, we may have Rtotal < R and do not fully utilize the bandwidth. To make
sure that Rtotal = R, we modify (3.24) by introducing proportional rationing [16],


















CLi = R. (3.25)




i . The utility of ui is obtained as,
U?i = ln(γi + βiR
?
i )− P ?i , (3.26)






t(Cti − Ct−1i ) is the payment from user ui.
Remark: Since at+1 > at, we have Rt+1j ≤ Rtj. Therefore, at clock t, ui is
guaranteed at least the amount of bit-rate Cti = max(0, R −
∑
j 6=i
Rtj). This is how
(3.24) comes from.
The rate allocation scheme described in Algorithm 1 has several advantages:
• The auction process is transparent to all users and simple enough for all users
to understand. Simplicity and transparency are two important factors to stim-
ulate auction since users may not be willing to join in the game if they do not
understand the auction process.
• The auction scheme can preserve privacy. Since the scheme is distributed,
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Algorithm 1 Cheat-Proof Rate Allocation Scheme Using Clock Auction
Given the available bandwidth R, step size δ > 0, and clock index t = 0, the
controller initializes a with a small value a0.
Repeat:
(1) the controller announces at to all the users.

















If Rttotal > R, compute C
t




t+1 = at + δ, t = t+1,
and go to (1).
















and allocate R?i = C
L
i to ui.








t(Cti − Ct−1i ) and the utility of
ui is U
?
i = ln(γi + βiR
?
i )− P ?i .
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users do not need to report their private information. Instead, they only need
to submit their demands.
• The computational complexity of each user is low since what the users need to








, Rmaxi )] for any given a.
• The computational complexity of the controller is low in that the controller
only needs to sum up the demands from the users, compare it with the available
bandwidth, and compute the cumulative clinch for each user.
• Through the auction, each user will converge to the unique proportionally fair
NE shown in Section 3.2. This is trivial due to the following two reasons:




i ≤ R, when δ is sufficient













• The scheme is cheat-proof, meaning that the best strategy of each user is to
report his/her true optimal demand at every clock. There is no incentive for
ui to deviate, and the proof is shown in Theorem 2.
Let Rti be user ui’s true optimal demand at clock t, and R̃i
t
be the claimed
demand that ui reports to the controller at clock t. Note that R̃i
t
can be any value
in [Rmini , R
max
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Figure 3.3: Illustration for the proof of Lemma 2: (a) If R̃i
t ≤ Rti and RL1i > Rmini ,
we can see that [ln(γi + βiR
L1
i ) − ∂ ln(γi+βiRi)∂Ri |Ri=RL1i (R
L1
i − RL2i )] ≥ ln(γi + βiRL2i );
(b) If R̃i
t




i , we can see that ln(γi + βiR
L1








Rt+1i , ..., R
L
i , where L is the final clock index, C
0
i , ..., C
L
i is the corresponding cumu-
lative clinch of ui from clock 0 to clock L, and a
0, ..., aL is the corresponding value
of a at each clock. Let Ui[Γ(t, L)] be the utility of ui in this scenario. Let Γ(−1, L) =








be two special cases of Γ(t, L).
Lemma 2: If all other users report their true optimal demands at every clock,
then Ui[Γ(t− 1, L1)] ≥ Ui[Γ(t, L2)].
Proof: From (3.26), we have,
Ui[Γ(t− 1, L1)] = ln(γi + βiRL1i )− a0C0i −
L1∑
k=1
ak(Cki − Ck−1i ),
Ui[Γ(t, L2)] = ln(γi + βiR
L2
i )− a0C0i −
L2∑
k=1
ak(Cki − Ck−1i ). (3.27)
• If R̃it ≤ Rti, according to Algorithm 1, we have L2 ≤ L1 and RL2i ≤ RL1i .
43
Then,
Ui[Γ(t− 1, L1)]− Ui[Γ(t, L2)]
= ln(γi + βiR
L1
i )− ln(γi + βiRL2i )−
L1∑
k=L2+1
ak(Cki − Ck−1i )
≥ ln(γi + βiRL1i )− ln(γi + βiRL2i )− aL1(CL1i − CL2i ). (3.28)















– if RL1i > R
min
i , according to (3.12), we get a








Ui[Γ(t− 1, L1)]− Ui[Γ(t, L2)]
≥ [ln(γi + βiRL1i )−






(RL1i −RL2i )]− ln(γi + βiRL2i )
≥ 0 (see Figure 3.3(a)). (3.29)
– if RL1i = R
min
i , since R
min
i ≤ RL2i ≤ RL1i = Rmini , we have RL2i = Rmini =
RL1i . Therefore,
Ui[Γ(t− 1, L1)] = Ui[Γ(t, L2)]. (3.30)
So, if R̃i
t ≤ Rti, we have Ui[Γ(t− 1, L1)] ≥ Ui[Γ(t, L2)].
• If R̃it > Rti, according to Algorithm 1, we have L2 ≥ L1 and RL2i ≥ RL1i .
Then,
Ui[Γ(t− 1, L1)]− Ui[Γ(t, L2)]
= ln(γi + βiR
L1
i )− ln(γi + βiRL2i ) +
L2∑
k=L1+1
ak(Cki − Ck−1i )
≥ ln(γi + βiRL1i )− ln(γi + βiRL2i ) + aL1(CL2i − CL1i ). (3.31)
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– if RL1i < R
max
i , according to (3.12), a








Ui[Γ(t− 1, L1)]− Ui[Γ(t, L2)]
≥ ln(γi + βiRL1i )− [ln(γi + βiRL2i )−







≥ 0 (see Figure 3.3(b)). (3.32)
– if RL1i = R
max
i , since R
max
i ≥ RL2i ≥ RL1i = Rmaxi , we have RL2i = Rmaxi =
RL1i . Therefore,
Ui[Γ(t− 1, L1)] = Ui[Γ(t, L2)]. (3.33)
So, if R̃i
t
> Rti, we still have Ui[Γ(t− 1, L1)] ≥ Ui[Γ(t, L2)].
In all, we can show that Ui[Γ(t− 1, L1)] ≥ Ui[Γ(t, L2)]. This completes the proof.
With Lemma 2, we can now show that the best strategy of each user is to
report his/her true optimal demand at every clock.
Theorem 2 (Cheat-Proof): Reporting true optimal demand at every clock is a
mutually best response for every user, i.e., Ui[Γ(L3, L3)] ≤ Ui[Γ(−1, L4)] ∀i.
Proof: If all the other users report their true optimal demands in every
clock, according to Lemma 2, we have Ui[Γ(L3, L3)] ≤ Ui[Γ(L3 − 1, L̃3)] ≤ ... ≤
Ui[Γ(−1, L4)], where L̃3 stands for the final clock index of the following scenario:
from clock 0 to clock L3−1, ui reports R̃i0, ..., R̃iL3−1, and from clock L3 to the final
clock L̃3, ui reports R
L3
i , ..., R
L̃3
i . Since all users are non-collaborative, reporting true
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optimal demand at every clock is a mutually best response for every user. There is
no incentive for the users to cheat since any cheating will lead to a loss in utility.
Therefore, the proposed scheme is cheat-proof. This completes the proof.
In the above theorem, we give a theoretical proof for the cheat-proof strategy.
In the following section, we will verify this cheat-proof strategy through experimental
results.
3.5 Experimental Results
In order to evaluate the proposed game-theoretic multi-user rate allocation
game, we conduct experiments on real video data. Seven video sequences: Akiyo,
Mobile, Table, Carphone, Coastguard, Foreman, and Football in QCIF format, are
tested. Notice that these video sequences include slow, medium or fast motion,
and smooth or complex scene. We use the state-of-art H.264 JM 9.0 video codec
to encode the video sequences [6]. By changing the quantization parameter (QP)
or using the rate control feature, we are able to compress the video sequences at
different bit-rate and achieve different quality requirements.
3.5.1 Parameter Estimation
From Section 3.1, we can see that there are several parameters in our frame-
work, γi, βi, R
min
i , and R
max
i . In this subsection, we will discuss how to estimate
these parameters.
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i (kb/s), and R
max








Akiyo 6.8449 0.0416 1.5119 84.5447
Carphone 6.6759 0.0114 20.2554 322.0153
Coastguard 6.6796 0.0043 28.4987 878.8011
Foreman 6.7418 0.0093 17.8168 388.7091
Football 6.2201 0.0024 286.311 1720
Mobile 6.3464 0.0025 225.0682 1610
Table 6.8135 0.0074 12.7781 481.1014
According to (3.3) and (3.6), we have:
PSNRi = 10(log10 e) ln
2552
Di
= (10 log10 e)(γi + βiRi) (3.34)
Therefore, we can estimate γi and βi using off-line training. For each video
sequence, we first generate a set of (PSNRi, Ri) by encoding the sequence using
H.264 JM 9.0 with different QP. Then, the optimal γ?i and β
?
i can be computed by:
(γ?i , β
?




[PSNRi(j)− (10 log10 e)(γi + βiRi(j))]2, (3.35)
where j is the index of the training set.
Through the training data and equation above, we get the optimal γ?i and β
?
i
for different video sequences and show them in Table 3.1. As shown in Figure 3.4,
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Figure 3.4: Training γ and β: (a) Football; (b) Coastguard.
with the optimal γ?i and β
?
i , the (10 log10 e)(γi+βiRi) can approximate PSNRi well.
Due to the page limitation, we only show the results for Football and Coastguard.
Similar results are observed for other sequences.
After finding the optimal γ?i and β
?





Suppose that the minimal desired PSNR (quality) constraint is PSNRmin, e.g.,
30dB, and the maximal satisfied PSNR (quality) constraint is PSNRmax, e.g., 45dB.














− γ?i ). (3.36)
According the equations above, the Rmini and R
max
i for different sequences are
obtained and shown in Table 3.1. From Table 3.1, we can see that the tested video
sequences can be classified to four categories according to β?, Rmini and R
max
i : slow
motion and smooth scene (Akiyo), medium motion and smooth scene (Carphone,
Foreman, and Table), medium motion and complex scene (Coastguard), and fast or
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Figure 3.5: Allocated rates for Akiyo, Carphone, Coastguard, Foreman, Table, Foot-
ball, and Mobile using different methods.
complex motion (Football and Mobile).
3.5.2 Multi-User Rate Allocation
We compare the proposed method with three approaches: the Absolute Fair-
ness in Rate (AFR), which equally divides the available bandwidth to all the users,
the Absolute Fairness in Distortion (AFD), which minimizes the maximal distor-
tion of all the users, i.e., min-max fairness, and the approach Maximizing the Sum
of the PSNRs (MSPSNR), i.e. the traditional optimization-based approach shown
in (3.2) with uniform weights. Notice that for AFR, AFD, and MSPSNR, the
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Figure 3.6: The sum of PSNR vs. the available network bandwidth R.
allocated rate should be within [Rmini , R
max
i ]. Otherwise, we set it to be R
min
i or
Rmaxi and re-allocate the rest rate for the other users. Given the video sequences
to be transmitted, the available bandwidth R, we can compute the rate allocated
to each video sequence using different methods, i.e., AFD, AFR, MSPSNR, and
the proposed method. Then, setting the allocated bit-rate as the target bit-rate,
we compress the video sequence using the rate control feature in H.264 JM 9.0
reference software. Finally, each user transmits the compressed bitstream to the
corresponding receiver.
In the experiments, we assume that there are seven users u1, u2, ..., u7. They
transmit Akiyo, Carphone, Coastguard, Foreman, Table, Football, and Mobile to
seven receivers r1, r2, ..., r7, respectively. We test R at 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 and
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Cheat−Proof Performance of Proposed Method
(b)
Figure 3.7: Cheat-proof performance: (a) AFD, AFR, and MSPSNR; (b) Proposed
Method.
5000 kb/s. The allocated bit-rate for each video sequence in different situations
(i.e., different R) using different methods (i.e., AFD, AFR, MSPSNR, and the
proposed method) are shown in Figure 3.5. From Figure 3.5, we can see that AFR
equally allocates the bandwidth to each users if the allocated bit-rate is within
[Rmini , R
max
i ]. AFD tries to allocate more bit-rate to the video sequence that has
more complex motion and/or scene (a smaller β?) to preserve constant quality among
different users. On the contrary, MSPSNR favors the video sequence that has
a larger β? since allocating more bit-rate to the sequence with a larger β? leads
to a greater increase in the sum of the PSNRs. However, with MSPSNR, the
sequence with β?i will not be allocated more bit-rate than R
min
i if there is a sequence
with β?j > β
?
i who has not been allocated its maximal rate requirement R
max
j yet.
Specifically, the rate controller will first allocate each user with Rmini . Then, the
remaining rates will be first allocated to Akiyo until the bit-rate of Akiyo achieves
its maximal requirement. If there are still some unused rates, then Carphone will
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be satisfied first. And the bit-rate of Football with the smallest β? stays at its
minimal requirement until all other sequences with higher β? have achieved their
maximal rate requirements. Obviously, this is not fair to the users who transmit
the sequences with smaller β?. By taking the proportional fairness into account,
the proposed method can avoid this disadvantage and balance the rate allocation
between the sequences with a larger β? and a smaller β?. For example, as shown in
Figure 3.5, when the total available network bandwidth R increases from 3000kb/s
to 4000kb/s, both the bit-rate of Mobile and Football increase. This is because
the proposed method with the proportional fairness criterion aims at maximizing
the product of the utility function Ui, and keeping a certain balance between the
sequences with a larger β? and a smaller β? leads to an increase in the product.
Let T PSNR =
∑N
i=1 PSNRi be the sum of the analytical PSNRi computed
by (3.34) of all the users. In Figure 3.6, we show T PSNR versus the available
network bandwidth R. We can see that there is a big gap between the performance
of AFD, AFR and MSPSNR, which means using AFD or AFR leads to a big
loss in the system performance. However, the performance of the proposed method
is almost the same as that of MSPSNR, which fully demonstrates the efficiency
of the proposed method. Therefore, while achieving a fair rate allocation among
different users, the proposed method still performs well in terms of total PSNR.
Finally, we evaluate the cheat-proof property of different methods. As shown
in Table 3.1, since β is the most important parameter representing the characteristics
of video sequences, the best way for ui to pretend as another user uj is to use βj
rather than βi in calculating optimal demand. Therefore, we evaluate the cheat-
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proof property in terms of β. In this experiment, the available network bandwidth
R is set to be 4.2Mb/s. We assume that u6 who transmits Mobile sequence will
cheat while other users are honest. In AFD, AFR and MSPSNR, u6 reports a
false β̃ to the controller by scaling the original β with a factor k, i.e., β̃ = kβ.










, Rmax6 )] and reports R̃6
t
to the controller. As shown in Figure 3.7(a), the PSNR performance of AFR is
independent of the scale factor k. This is because AFR does not care about β and
just equally allocates the bandwidth to each user if the allocated bit-rate is within
[Rmini , R
max
i ]. The PSNR performance of AFD decreases as k increases. This is
because AFD tries to allocate more bit-rate to the video sequence with a smaller β
to preserve constant quality among different users. Therefore, with AFD, all users
tend to report a smaller β to the controller to obtain a better PSNR performance.
On the contrary, the PSNR performance of MSPSNR is an increasing piecewise
constant function in terms of k. This is because, with MSPSNR, the sequence
with βi will not be allocated more bit-rate than R
min
i if there is a sequence with
βj > βi who has not been allocated its maximal rate requirement R
max
j yet. To be
allocated more rate and obtain a higher PSNR, u6 should increase k until at least
kβ6 > βj where βj = minl(βl > β6). Therefore, with MSPSNR, all users tend to
report a larger β to the controller to obtain a better PSNR performance. However,
with the proposed method, as shown in Figure 3.7(b), reporting the optimal demand
generated by the true β (k=1) will lead to the best utility. Any deviation will lead
to a loss in terms of utility, which means that the proposed method is cheat-proof.
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Therefore, the proposed method ensures all users will be honest about their private
information.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a game-theoretic framework for multi-user multi-
media rate allocation and a distributed cheat-proof scheme for users to converge to
the NE of the game. Different from the traditional optimization-based approaches,
which mainly focus on the efficiency issue, e.g. maximizing the system performance,
the proposed method not only considers the efficiency issue but also the fairness
issue. From the experimental results on real video sequences, we can see that with
the proportional fairness criterion, the proposed game-theoretic method can effi-
ciently and fairly allocate bit-rate to different users by allocating more bit-rate to
the sequence with slower motion and/or simpler scene while keeping an eye on the
fast motion and/or complex scene sequence. We also find that, with the proposed
distributed cheat-proof rate allocation scheme, reporting the true optimal demand
at every clock is the mutual best response for every user. Moreover, we show that
the traditional optimization-based method that maximizes the weighted sum of the
PSNRs is a special case of the game-theoretic framework with the utility function
defined as an exponential function of PSNR.
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Chapter 4
Peer-to-Peer Cooperative Video Streaming Social Networks
With the rapid development of signal processing, communication, and net-
working technologies, video-over-IP applications become more and more popular
and have attracted millions of users over the Internet [1] [9]. One simple solution to
video streaming over Internet is the client-server service model [47] [76], where the
video is streamed directly from a server to clients. However, with the client-server
service model, the upload bandwidth of the server grows proportionally with the
number of clients [86], which makes the large-scale video streaming impractical.
To reduce the workload of the server, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) service model is
proposed [36] [133], where a peer not only acts as a client to download data from
the network, but also acts as a server to upload data for the other peers in the
network. The upload bandwidth of the peers reduces the workload placed on the
server dramatically, which makes large-scale video streaming possible. Recently,
several industrial large-scale P2P video streaming systems have been developed,
including Coolstreaming [133], PPLive [4], PPStream [5], UUSee [8] and Sopcast
[7]. Studies show that these systems can support hundreds of thousands of users
simultaneously [65].
While P2P video streaming systems have achieved promising results, they have
several drawbacks. First, there is a large number of unnecessary traverse links within
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a provider’s network. As observed in [129], each P2P bit on the Verizon network
traverses 1000 miles and takes 5.5 metro-hops on average. Second, there is a huge
number of cross Internet Service Provider (ISP) traffic. The studies in [71] [107]
showed that 50%-90% of the existing local pieces in active peers are downloaded
externally. Third, the differences in playback time among peers can be as high as
140 seconds [65], and the lag can be greater if the source rate is higher. Fourth,
most of the current P2P systems assume that all peers are willing to contribute
their resources. However, this assumption may not be true since the P2P systems
are self-organizing networks and the peers are selfish by nature [128] [60]. Note that
the selfish peers will act as free-riders if being free-riders can improve their utilities.
In the literature, many approaches have been proposed to overcome these
drawbacks. Karagiannis et al. [71] and Madhyastha et al. [87] proposed to use
locality-aware P2P schemes to reduce the unnecessary traverse links within and
cross ISPs and thus reduce the download time. Purandare and Guha [100] proposed
an alliance based peering scheme to reduce the playback time lag and improve
the Quality of Service (QoS). Xie et al. [129] proposed a P4P architecture that
allows cooperative traffic control between applications and network providers. To
stimulate selfish peers to contribute their resources, payment mechanisms [121] [57]
and reputation schemes [88] [59] are proposed, where peers pay points to receive data
and earn points by forwarding data to others. However, such payment or reputation
based mechanisms often demand a centralized architecture and thus hinder their
scalability.
Game theory is a mathematical tool that analyzes the strategic interactions
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among multiple decision makers. Recently, it draws great attentions in cognitive
networking [123], multimedia social networking [136], and is being applied to many
multimedia signal processing problems such as video coding [12] and multimedia
communications [29]. In P2P networks, peers make intelligent decisions on their
strategies of requesting and forwarding packets based on their needs and other peers’
actions. Moreover, since peers are rational and thus naturally selfish, they have no
incentive to contribute their resources for other peers. Therefore, it is natural to
study the intelligent behaviors and interactions of selfish peers in P2P networks from
a game theoretic perspective [128] [84]. Using a mental cost to describe the level
of the peer’s altruism, the authors in [128] presented a game theoretical model to
analyze nodes’ behaviors and the influence of incentive mechanism. In [84], a game
theoretic framework is proposed for designing distributed, cheat-proof and attack-
resistant cooperation stimulation strategies for P2P live streaming social networks.
Most of the existing schemes treat every peer as an independent individual.
However, in reality, every peer can have a large number of geographically neighboring
peers with large intra-group upload and download bandwidths, e.g. the peers in the
same lab, building, or campus. Here, we name those geographically neighboring
peers with large intra-group upload and download bandwidths as group peers. To
reduce the unnecessary traverse links and improve network efficiency, instead of
considering each peer’s strategy independently, we investigate possible cooperation
among the group peers. Moreover, since peers are naturally selfish, they will act as
free-riders if doing so can improve their utilities. In such a case, full cooperation
cannot be guaranteed. Instead, to achieve better payoff, rational peers will adjust
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their degree of cooperation by learning from their payoff history. Therefore, a key
question to answer is: “how a group of selfish peers should cooperate with each other
to achieve better streaming performance?”
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows.
• We propose a cooperative streaming scheme to enable cooperation among
group peers to achieve better streaming performance.
• In the proposed scheme, we define the utility function of a peer by taking into
account the possibility of real-time streaming and the cost of acting as a server
to upload data for the other peers.
• Due to their selfish nature, peers tend to act as free riders to improve their
own utilities. Moreover, the peers may take out-of-equilibrium strategies due
to the uncertainty of the strategies of the other peers. Therefore, a robust
Nash equilibrium (NE) solution is desired for every peer. In this chapter, we
formulate the cooperative streaming problem as an evolutionary game and
derive the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for every peer, which is the
desired stable NE.
• To stimulate cooperation, the cooperative streaming scheme should be simple
since peers may not be willing to join the cooperative streaming if the protocol
is complicated. The proposed cooperative streaming scheme is very simple.
Each peer tosses a coin to decide whether to be an agent or a free rider. If the
outcome is head, the peer acts as an agent to download data from the peers
outside the group. Otherwise, the peer acts as a free-rider to download data
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from the agents. And the probability of being a head for the coin is learned
from the peer’s own past payoff history.
• Due to the highly dynamic behaviors of the peers, i.e., the peers may join or
leave the P2P network at any time, the cooperative streaming scheme should
be distributed. We propose a distributed algorithm for every peer to approach
the ESS by learning from the peer’s own past payoff history.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we describe the
system model and the utility function. Then, we show in details how to select agents
in a homogeneous group in Section 4.2. We extend the analysis to the heterogeneous
case in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we propose a distributed learning algorithm for
ESS. Finally, we show the simulation results in Section 4.5 and draw conclusions in
Section 4.6.
4.1 The System Model and Utility Function
4.1.1 System Model
As shown in Figure 4.1, there is a set of group peers1 (three in this example)
who want to view a real-time video streaming simultaneously. Within a group, every
peer can choose either to be an agent or a normal peer. If the peer serves as an
agent, he/she not only needs to act as a client to download video data from the
1How to group the peers itself is an interesting problem. However, in this chapter, we assume
that the peers have already been grouped and mainly focus on how the group peers cooperate with




Figure 4.1: A cooperative streaming example.
agents in other groups, but also needs to act as a server to upload video streams
for both the agents in other groups and the peers in the same group. However, if
the peer chooses not to be an agent, he/she only needs to download/upload data
from/to the peers in the same group. We assume that the upload and download
bandwidth within the group is larger than those cross groups. In such a case, peers
tend to be a normal peer due to the selfish nature. Nevertheless, the normal peers,
on the other hand, take a risk of receiving degraded streaming performance since
there may not be sufficient agents to download data from other groups. In order
to achieve good streaming performance through cooperation, a question need to be
addressed: given a group of peers, which peers should serve as agents.
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4.1.2 Utility Functions
In a P2P network, a peer not only acts as a client to download video data from
the other peers but also acts as a server to upload video data for the other peers.
Therefore, while a peer can benefit from downloading data from the other peers,
he/she also incurs a cost in uploading data for the other peers, where the cost can
be resource spending on uploading data, e.g. bandwidth, buffer size.
Given the group peers, u1, u2, ..., uN , we assume that k peers are willing to
serve as agents to download multimedia data from the peers outside the group. Let
the download rate be the transmission speed between an agent and a corresponding
peer outside the group. If we denote that the download rates of the k agents are r1,





Since the agents randomly and independently select peers outside the group for
downloading data, the download rate ri’s are random variables. According to [68],
the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of a peer’s download bandwidth can
be modelled as a linear function, which means that the PDF of a peer’s down-
load bandwidth can be modelled as a uniform distribution, i.e., ri’s are uniformly
distributed.
To provide more insight into the cooperative streaming problem, we first con-
sider a simple scenario without buffering. Then, we extend our discussion to the
case when there is buffering effect in Section 4.5. For the scenario without buffering,
if the total download rate yk is not smaller than the source rate r, then the group
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peers can have a real-time streaming, and all the group peers can obtain a certain
gain G. Otherwise, there will be some delay, and in this case we assume the gain is
zero. Therefore, given the total download rate yk and the source rate r, if peer ui
chooses to be an agent, then the utility function of ui is given by
UA,i(k) = Pr(yk ≥ r)G− Ci,∀k ∈ [1, N ], (4.2)
where Ci is the cost of ui when he/she serves as an agent, and Pr(yk ≥ r) is the
probability of achieving a real-time streaming which can be computed according to
Theorem 1.
Since the upload and download bandwidths within the group is large, the cost
of uploading data to the other peers within the group can be negligible. In such






Pr(yk ≥ r)G, if k ∈ [1, N − 1];
0, if k = 0.
(4.3)
Theorem 1: If r1, r2,..., rk are i.i.d. uniformly distributed within [r
L, rU ],
then Pr(yk ≥ r) is given by












(k − l)k − sgn(r̂ − l)(r̂ − l)k
]
, (4.4)
and when k is sufficiently large, Pr(yk ≥ r) can be approximated as
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Proof :Let r̂l =
rl−rL
rU−rL , ∀l, then r̂1, r̂2, ..., r̂k are i.i.d. uniformly distributed
































 sgn(y − l)(y − l)k−1. (4.8)
Since Pr(yk ≥ r) = Pr(ŷk ≥ r̂), according to (4.8), we have
Pr(yk ≥ r)

















(k − l)k − sgn(r̂ − l)(r̂ − l)k
]
. (4.9)
When k is sufficiently large, according to the Central Limit Theory, the dis-

















4.2 Agents Selection Within A Homogeneous Group
In the previous section, we have discussed the system model and the peer’s
utility function. To optimize the streaming performance, proper peers should serve
as agents to download data from the peers outside the group. In this section, we
will discuss how to select agents within a homogeneous group where the cost of all
peers serving as an agent is assumed to be the same.
4.2.1 Centralized Agent Selection
If there is a central controller who can choose which peers should act as agents,
then a straightforward criterion of selecting proper agents is to maximize the social
welfare, which is the sum of all peers’ utilities.
Let Ci = C be the cost of a peer serving as an agent in a homogeneous group.
Then the social welfare of an N − peer group with k agents can be calculated by
SW (k) = Pr(yk ≥ r)GN − kC. (4.11)
Based on (4.11), the agent selection problem to maximize the social welfare
can be formulated as
max
k
SW (k) = max
k
[Pr(yk ≥ r)GN − kC] , (4.12)
where k ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
By solving (4.12), we can find the optimal k? that maximizes the social wel-
fare. Then, the central controller can choose k? peers from the group as agents to
download data from the peers outside the group based on some mechanism, e.g.
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the peers take turns to serve as agents. However, since peers’ behaviors are highly
dynamic, they may join in or leave the P2P network at any time. In such a case,
the centralized approach may not be practical.
4.2.2 Distributed Agent Selection
To overcome the drawback of the centralized approach, it is possible to consider
a distributed approach where each peer acts as an agent with probability x. Then,











Pr(yi ≥ r)GN − iC
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. (4.13)













Pr(yi ≥ r)GN − iC
]
s.t. 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. (4.14)
However, since peers are selfish by nature, they are not as cooperative as a
system designer/controller desires. By solving (4.14), we can find the optimal x?
that maximizes the social welfare, but x? can not maximize each peer’s own utility.
Therefore, the social welfare maximizer x? is not attainable when peers are selfish.
Moreover, the solution to the optimization problem shown in (4.14) is not stable
since any perturbation will lead to a new solution.
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4.2.3 Evolutionary Cooperative Streaming Game
In order to provide a robust equilibrium strategy for the selfish peers, we adopt
the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) [110] [122], which is defined as
follows.
Definition 1: A strategy a? is an ESS if and only if, ∀a 6= a?, a? satisfies
• equilibrium condition: Ui(a, a?) ≤ Ui(a?, a?), and
• stability condition: if Ui(a, a?) = Ui(a?, a?), Ui(a, a) < Ui(a?, a),
where Ui(a1, a2) is the utility of player i when he/she uses strategy a1 and another
player uses strategy a2.
Since all peers are selfish, they will cheat if cheating can improve their payoffs,
which means that all peers are uncertain of other peers’ actions and utilities. In such
a case, to improve their utilities, peers will try different strategies in every play and
learn from the strategic interactions using the methodology of understanding-by-
building. During the process, the percentage of peers using a certain pure strategy
may change. Such a population evolution can be modelled by replicator dynamics.
Specifically, let xa stand for the probability of a peer using pure strategy a ∈ A,
where A = {A,N} is the set of pure strategies including being an agent (A) and
not being an agent (N). By replicator dynamics, the evolution dynamics of xa are
given by the following differential equation
ẋa = η[Ū(a, x−a)− Ū(xa)]xa, (4.15)
where Ū(a, x−a) is the average payoff of the peers using pure strategy a, x−a is the
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set of peers who use pure strategies other than a, Ū(xa) is the average payoff of all
peers, and η is a positive scale factor.
From (4.15), we can see that if adopting pure strategy a can lead to a higher
payoff than the average level, the probability of a peer using a will grow and the
growth rate ẋa/xa is proportional to the difference between the average payoff of
using strategy a (i.e., Ū(a, x−a)) and the average payoff of all peers (i.e., Ū(xa)).
4.2.4 Analysis of the Cooperative Streaming Game
According to (4.2) and (4.3), the average payoff of a peer if he/she choose to
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, (4.16)





xi(1− x)N−1−i is the
probability that there are i agents out of N − 1 other peers.










 xi(1− x)N−1−iPr(yi ≥ r)G. (4.17)
According to (4.16) and (4.17), the average payoff of a peer is
Ū(x) = xŪA(x) + (1− x)ŪN(x). (4.18)
Substituting (4.18) back to (4.15), we have
ẋ = ηx(1− x)[ŪA(x)− ŪN(x)]. (4.19)
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Figure 4.2: The deceasing property of wi.
At equilibrium x?, no player will deviate from the optimal strategy, which
means ẋ? = 0, and we can obtain x? = 0, 1, or the solutions to ŪA(x) = ŪN(x).
However, since ẋ? = 0 is only the necessary condition for x? to be ESS, we examine
the sufficient condition for each ESS candidate and draw the following conclusions
with the proofs shown in Theorem 2-4.
• x? = 0 is an ESS only when Pr(y1 ≥ r)G− C ≤ 0.
• x? = 1 is an ESS only when Pr(yN ≥ r)G− Pr(yN−1 ≥ r)G ≥ C.
• Let x? be the solution to ŪA(x) = ŪN(x), and x? ∈ (0, 1). Then, x? is an ESS.
Lemma 1: Let f(x) = ŪA(x) − ŪN(x), then f ′(x) < 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. Proof :
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 xi(1− x)N−1−iwi − C, (4.20)
where wi = [Pr(yi+1 ≥ r)− Pr(yi ≥ r)]G.



























 xi−1(1− x)N−2−i[i− (N − 1)x]wi,
(4.21)
where i1 is the integer such that i1 ≤ (N − 1)x and i1 + 1 > (N − 1)x.
Since wi stands for the additional gain by introducing one more agent into
the i-agent system, as shown in Fig. 4.2, it is a decreasing function in terms
of i, which means that wi ≥ wi1 ,∀i ≤ i1 and wi ≤ wi1 ,∀i > i1. Therefore,
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Therefore, f ′(x) < 0, ∀x ∈ (0, 1).
• The derivative of f(x) over x at x = 0 can be computed by





















(N − 1)ε(1− ε)N−2w1
ε
= (N − 1)(w1 − w0)
< 0. (4.23)
where the last inequality comes from the fact that wi is a decreasing function
in terms of i.
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• Similarly, the derivative of f(x) over x at x = 1 can be computed by






















−(N − 1)(1− ε)N−2εwN−2
ε
= (N − 1)(wN−1 − wN−2)
< 0. (4.24)
where the last inequality comes from the fact that wi is a decreasing function
in terms of i.
In all, f ′(x) < 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Theorem 2: The condition for x? = 0 to be an ESS is Pr(y1 ≥ r)G−C ≤ 0.
Proof : According to (4.16-4.18), the utility that a peer using mixed strategy
x and the other peers use mixed strategy x? = 0 can be written as
Ū(x, 0) = ŪN(0) + (ŪA(0)− ŪN(0))x,
where ŪA(0) = Pr(y1 ≥ r)G− C and ŪN(0) = 0.
• If Pr(y1 ≥ r)G− C > 0, i.e. ŪA(0) > ŪN(0), every peer will deviate to x = 1
to obtain ŪA(0) rather than ŪN(0).
• If Pr(y1 ≥ r)G− C < 0, i.e. ŪA(0) < ŪN(0), every peer will stay at x = 0 to
obtain ŪN(0) rather than ŪA(0).
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• If Pr(y1 ≥ r)G − C = 0, i.e. ŪA(0) = ŪN(0), then Ū(x, 0) = 0 ∀x, and
f(0) = ŪA(0)− ŪN(0) = 0. According to Lemma 1, we know that f ′(x) < 0
∀x ∈ [0, 1], so f(x) = ŪA(x)− ŪN(x) < 0. In such a case, Ū(0, x) = ŪN(x) >
Ū(x, x) = ŪN(x)+(ŪA(x)−ŪN(x))x, which means x? = 0 is an ESS according
to Definition 1.
Therefore, x? = 0 is an ESS only when Pr(y1 ≥ r)G−C ≤ 0.
Theorem 3: The condition for x? = 1 to be an ESS is Pr(yN ≥ r)G −
Pr(yN−1 ≥ r)G ≥ C.
Proof : According to (4.16-4.18), the utility that a peer using mixed strategy
x and the other peers use mixed strategy x? = 1 can be written as
Ū(x, 1) = ŪN(1) + (ŪA(1)− ŪN(1))x,
where ŪA(1) = Pr(yN ≥ r)G− C and ŪN(1) = Pr(yN−1 ≥ r)G.
• If Pr(yN ≥ r)G − Pr(yN−1 ≥ r)G < C, i.e., ŪN(1) > ŪA(1), every peer will
deviate to x = 0 to obtain ŪN(1) rather than ŪA(1).
• If Pr(yN ≥ r)G − Pr(yN−1 ≥ r)G > C, i.e., ŪN(1) < ŪA(1), every peer will
stay at x = 1 to obtain ŪA(1) rather than ŪN(1).
• If Pr(yN ≥ r)G − Pr(yN−1 ≥ r)G = C, i.e. ŪN(1) = ŪA(1), then Ū(x, 1) =
ŪN(1) ∀x, and f(1) = ŪA(1)− ŪN(1) = 0. According to Lemma 1, we know
that f ′(x) < 0 ∀x ∈ [0, 1], so f(x) = ŪA(x) − ŪN(x) > 0. In such a case,
Ū(1, x) = ŪN(x) + (ŪA(x)− ŪN(x))1 > Ū(x, x) = ŪN(x) + (ŪA(x)− ŪN(x))x,
which means x? = 1 is an ESS according to Definition 1.
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Therefore, x? = 1 is an ESS only when Pr(yN ≥ r)G− Pr(yN−1 ≥ r)G ≥ C.
Theorem 4: If x? ∈ (0, 1) is a solution to ŪA(x) = ŪN(x), then x? is an ESS.
Proof : Let Ūi(x, x
?) be the utility of player i when player i uses mixed strategy
x and other users use mixed strategy x?. Then, we have
Ūi(x, x
?) = xŪA(x
?) + (1− x)ŪN(x?). (4.25)








which means x? satisfies the equilibrium condition shown in Definition 1.
Moreover, according to (4.18), we have
Ūi(x, x) = ŪN(x) + (ŪA(x)− ŪN(x))x, (4.27)
and
Ūi(x
?, x) = ŪN(x) + (ŪA(x)− ŪN(x))x?. (4.28)
Therefore, we have
Ūi(x
?, x)− Ūi(x, x) = (ŪA(x)− ŪN(x))(x? − x). (4.29)
From Lemma 1, we know that f(x) = ŪA(x) − ŪN(x) is a monotonically
decreasing function. Since ŪA(x
?) = ŪN(x
?), ŪA(x) − ŪN(x) > 0 if x < x?, and
ŪA(x)− ŪN(x) < 0 if x > x?. Therefore, (ŪA(x)− ŪN(x))(x?−x) > 0, ∀x 6= x?, i.e.
Ūi(x
?, x) > Ūi(x, x),∀x 6= x?, (4.30)
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which means x? satisfies the stability condition shown in Definition 1.
According to (4.26) and (4.30), we know that x? is an ESS.
4.3 Agents Selection Within A Heterogeneous Group
In this section, we will discuss how to select agents within a heterogeneous
group where the costs of the peers acting as agents are different.
Let xi,ai stands for the probability of peer ui using pure strategy ai ∈ A.
By replicator dynamics, the evolution dynamics of xi,ai are given by the following
differential equation
ẋi,ai = η[Ūi(ai, x−i)− Ūi(xi)]xi,ai , (4.31)
where Ūi(ai, x−i) is the average payoff of peer ui using pure strategy ai, Ūi(xi) is the
average payoff of peer ui using mixed strategy xi, and η is a positive scale factor.
Since it is generally very difficult to represent Ūi(ai, x−i) and Ūi(xi) in a com-
pact form, in the following, we first analyze a two-player game to gain some insight.
Then, we generalize the observation in the two-player game to the multi-player game.
Table 4.1: Utility table of a two-player game.
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4.3.1 Two-Player Game
Let x1 and x2 be the probability of u1 and u2 being an agent, respectively.
Let B1 = Pr(y1 ≥ r)G and B2 = Pr(y2 ≥ r)G. Then, the payoff matrix of u1 and
u2 can be written as in Table 4.1. Therefore, the average payoff Ū1(A, x2) can be
computed by
Ū1(A, x2) = (B2 − C1)x2 + (B1 − C1)(1− x2), (4.32)
and the average payoff Ū1(x1) becomes
Ū1(x1) = (B2 − C1)x1x2 + (B1 − C1)x1(1− x2) + B1(1− x1)x2. (4.33)
According to (4.31), the replicator dynamics equation of u1 is given by
ẋ1 = ηx1(1− x1) [B1 − C1 − (2B1 −B2)x2] . (4.34)
Similarly, the replicator dynamics equation of u2 can be computed by
ẋ2 = ηx2(1− x2) [B1 − C2 − (2B1 −B2)x1] . (4.35)
At equilibrium, we know that ẋ1 = 0 and ẋ2 = 0. According to (4.34) and









According to [41], if an equilibrium of the replicator dynamics equations is a
locally asymptotically stable point in a dynamic system, it is an ESS. Therefore,
by viewing (4.34) and (4.35) as a nonlinear dynamic system and analyzing the
corresponding Jacobian matrix, we can examine whether the five equilibria are ESSs.
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where J11 = (1 − 2x1)(B1 − C1 − (2B1 − B2)x2), J12 = −x1(1 − x1)(2B1 − B2),
J21 = −x2(1− x2)(2B1 −B2), and J22 = (1− 2x2)(B1 − C2 − (2B1 −B2)x1).
The asymptotical stability requires that det(J) > 0 and tr(J) < 0 [41]. Sub-








(4.36), we conclude that
• If B2−B1−C1 > 0 and B2−B1−C2 > 0, there is a unique ESS (1, 1), where
both u1 and u2 converge to be agents.
• Elseif B2 − B1 − C1 > 0 and B2 − B1 − C2 < 0, there is a unique ESS (1, 0),
where u1 converges to be an agent and u2 converges to be a free-rider.
• Elseif B2 − B1 − C1 < 0 and B2 − B1 − C2 > 0, there is a unique ESS (0, 1),
where u2 converges to be an agent and u1 converges to be a free-rider.
• Else, there are two ESSs (0, 1) and (1, 0), where the converged strategy profiles
depends on the initial strategy profiles.
From the above analysis, we can see that when the gain of being an agent
(B2 − B1) is greater than the cost of being an agent (C1 or C2), the peer tends to
be an agent. And the peer with a higher cost tends to be a free-rider and rely on
the peer with a lower cost.
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Algorithm 2 : A Distributed Learning Algorithm For ESS
1. Given the step size η and the slot index t = 0, each peer ui initializes xi with
xi(0).
2. During slot t, for q = 1 : M ,
• ui tosses a coin with probability xi(t) being head. If the outcome is head,
ui serves as an agent and downloads data from the peers outside the group
with download rate ri(t, q). On the other hand, if the outcome is tail, ui
acts as a free-rider and downloads the data from the agents.
• ui computes his/her utility using (4.39).
• ui computes the indicator function using (4.38).
3. Then, ui approximates Ūi(A, x−i(t)) and Ūi(xi(t)) using (4.40) and (4.41).
4. Finally, ui updates the probability of being an agent xi(t) using (4.37).
4.3.2 Multi-Player Game
From the analysis of the two-player game, we can infer that the peer with
a higher cost (Ci) tends to take advantage of the peer with a lower cost. This
observation can be extended to multi-player game. If there are more than two peers
in the game, the strategy of the peers with higher C ′is will converge to “N” with
a greater probability. The peers with lower C ′is tend to be agents since they suffer
relatively heavier losses if no one serves as an agent.
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4.4 A Distributed Learning Algorithm For ESS
From the previous two sections, we can see that the ESS can be found by solv-
ing the replicator dynamics equations ((4.19) or (4.31)). However, solving the repli-
cator dynamics equations require the exchange of private information and strategies
adopted by other peers. In this section, we will present a distributed learning algo-
rithm that can gradually converge to ESS without information exchange.
We first discretize the replicator dynamics equation shown in (4.31) as





where t is the slot index and xi(t) is the probability of ui being an agent during slot
t. Here, we assume that each slot can be further divided into M subslots and each
peer can choose to be an agent or not at the beginning of each subslot.
From (4.37), we can see that in order to update xi(t + 1), we need to first





1, if ui is an agent at subslot q in slot t,
0, else,
(4.38)
where q is the subslot index.





G− Ci, if ui is an agent and rt ≥ r,
−Ci, if ui is an agent and rt < r,
G, if ui is not an agent and r
t ≥ r,




where rt is the total download rate of the agents and r is the source rate.
Then, Ūi(A, x−i(t)) can be approximated using
Ūi(A, x−i(t)) =
∑M
q=1 Ui(t, q)1i(t, q)∑M
q=1 1i(t, q)
, (4.40)







Based on (4.37-4.41), ui can gradually learn the ESS. In Algorithm 2, we
summarize the detailed procedures of the proposed distributed learning algorithm.
4.5 Simulation Results
In all simulations, the parameters G, rL, and rU are set to be 1, 50, and
800, respectively. For convenience, in the rest of this chapter, we denote the cen-
tralized approach maximizing the social welfare shown in (4.12) as MSW-C, the
distributed approach maximizing the social welfare shown in (4.14) as MSW-D, and
the ESS-based approach as ESS-D. We compare the proposed methods with the
traditional P2P non-cooperation method, denoted as Non-Coop. In Non-Coop,
each peer acts as an individual and randomly selects some peers for downloading
video streams. Such a protocol has been widely used in the existing P2P systems,
e.g., Coolstreaming [133] and PPLive [4].
In the first simulation, we show the social welfare (the sum of all peers’ util-
ities) comparison among different approaches, where we assume that there are 20
homogenous peers and the cost C is 0.1. As show in Fig. 4.3, MSW-C achieves the
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best social welfare performance since its objective function is to maximize the social
welfare with pure strategy. By using the mixed strategy to maximize the social
welfare, MSW-D achieves the second best social welfare performance. However, as
discussed in Section 4.2.2, the solution to MSW-D is not stable. With ESS-D, a
stable NE solution can be obtained at the cost of a slight loss in social welfare. Nev-
ertheless, all three proposed algorithms perform much better than the Non-Coop
method. In Non-Coop, the social welfare performance decreases linearly in terms
of the source rate. With cooperation and adaptively selecting the proper number of
agents, all three proposed algorithms can preserve a high social welfare performance
even with a large source rate.
In the second simulation, we evaluate the convergence property of the ESS-D.
In Fig. 4.4, we show the replicator dynamic of the cooperation streaming game with
homogeneous peers, where C = 0.1 and r = 500. We can see that starting from
a high initial value, all peers gradually reduce their probabilities of being an agent
since being a free-rider more often can bring a higher payoff. However, since too low
a probability of being an agent increases the chance of having no peer be an agent,
the probability of being an agent will finally converge to a certain value which is
determined by the number of peers.
In Fig. 4.5, we show the replicator dynamic of the cooperation streaming game
with 20 heterogeneous peers, where r = 500 and the cost Ci is randomly chosen from
[0.1, 0.3]. We further assume that Ci is monotonically increasing in i where u1 has
the lowest cost and u20 has the highest cost. From Fig. 4.5, we can see that the peers
with lower costs (u1, u2, and u3 in this simulation) converge to be an agent while
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Figure 4.3: The social welfare comparison among Non-Coop, MSW-C, MSW-D,
and ESS-D.
the peers with higher costs (u4 − u20 in this simulation) converge to be a free-rider.
This observation coincides with our conclusion in Section 4.3.2, which is “the peers
with lower costs tend to be an agent since they suffer relatively higher losses if no
one serves as an agent”. Note that due to the space limitation, we only show the
behavior dynamics of u1 − u4. All other peers u5 − u20 have the similar behavior
dynamics with u4, and they all converge to be free-riders.
In the third simulation, we compare the performance of Non-Coop and ESS-
D in terms of the probability of real-time streaming, which is defined as the proba-
bility that the total download rate is greater than the source rate. The simulation
results are shown in Fig. 4.6. We can see that with cooperation, the probability of
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Figure 4.4: Behavior dynamic of a homogeneous group of peers.
real-time streaming can be significantly improved especially at the high source rate
region. We also find that at the high source rate region, the probability of real-time
streaming increases as N increases.
The visual quality comparison between Non-Coop and ESS-D is shown in
Fig. 4.7. In this simulation, we fix the probability of real-time streaming to be
0.85. According to Fig. 4.6, we can see that the corresponding source rates for
“Non-Coop”, “ESS-D with N=2”, “ESS-D with N=3”, and “ESS-D with N=4”
are around 100kb/s, 300kb/s, 520kb/s, and 720kb/s, respectively. By setting the
above source rates as the target bitrates, we encode the Foreman sequence with CIF
format using H.264 encoder. From Fig. 4.7, we can see that the video visual quality
with the proposed ESS-D is much better than that with Non-Coop.
Then, we show the simulation result of the source rate versus the utility. As
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Figure 4.5: Behavior dynamic of a heterogeneous group of peers.
shown in Fig. 4.8, without cooperation, if the peer requires a utility around 0.8, the
source rate can not be larger than 130 kb/s. However, with cooperation, the source
rate can be more than 400 kb/s even when there are only 2 peers. Therefore, with
cooperation, the peers can enjoy much higher quality video with the same utility.
In the fourth simulation, we consider the case that the peers in the same group
are viewing multiple channels with L being the number of the channels. We assume
that the source rate is the same for all channels and there are 20 homogenous peers
with the cost C = 0.1. Similar to the View-Upload Decoupling (VUD) scheme [127],
the uploading and downloading are decoupled in the proposed ESS-D algorithm in
this case. We allow cooperation among all the peers where the agent may download
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Figure 4.6: The probability of real-time streaming comparison between Non-Coop
and ESS-D.
source data that he/she is not viewing. As shown in Fig. 4.9, without cooperation,
if the peer requires a utility around 0.8, the source rate can not be larger than 130
kb/s in the Non-Coop method. However, with the proposed ESS-D algorithm, the
source rate can be around 240kb/s even when the peers are view 8 different channels.
This phenomenon fully demonstrates the efficiency of the proposed method.
In the last simulation, we consider the scenario when there is buffering effect.
In such a scenario, the gain in the utility will not drop to zero when the total
download rate is smaller than the source rate. Instead, the gain should maintain




Figure 4.7: The visual quality comparison: (a) Non-Coop; (b) ESS-D with N=2;
(c) ESS-D with N=3; (d) ESS-D with N=4.











E [ln(yk)] G, if k ∈ [1, N − 1];
0, if k = 0.
(4.42)
From the above utility function, we can see that for any given source rate
r, the gain increases as the total download rate yk increases. Moreover, since the
probability of playback delay becomes smaller with more data in the buffer, a certain
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Figure 4.8: Single-source rate comparison between Non-Coop and ESS-D.
increase in the high yk region should lead to a less significant gain than that in the
low yk region [30]. Here, we use the ln(.) function to characterize such properties.
Nevertheless, other functions that have similar properties can also be used.
The social welfare comparison between Non-Coop and ESS-D with the util-
ity function in (4.42) is shown in Fig. 4.10. From Fig. 4.10, we can see that when
the utility function in (4.42) is used, the social welfare performance of Non-Coop
no longer decreases linearly in terms of the source rate. This phenomenon is mainly
because, with the existence of buffers, the gain will not drop to zero when the total
download rate is smaller than the source rate. Nevertheless, ESS-D can still lead
to a much higher social welfare performance for all source rates, compared with
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Figure 4.9: Multi-source rate comparison between Non-Coop and ESS-D.
Non-Coop. Moreover, we should notice that all the analysis in Section 4.2 is still
applicable to the utility function in (4.42).
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a cooperative streaming scheme to address the
network inefficiency problem encountered by the traditional non-cooperative P2P
schemes. We answer the question of “how a group of selfish peers with large intra-
group upload and download bandwidths cooperate with each other to achieve better
streaming performance” by formulating the problem as an evolutionary game and
deriving the ESS for every peer. We further propose a distributed learning algorithm
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Figure 4.10: The social welfare comparison between Non-Coop and ESS-D when
the utility function is defined as (4.42).
for each peer to converge to the ESS by learning from his/her own past payoff
history. From the simulation results, we can see that compared with the traditional
non-cooperative P2P schemes, the proposed algorithm achieves much better social
welfare, higher probability of real-time streaming, and better video quality (higher
source rate). Moreover, by incorporated with the recent proposed View-Upload
Decoupling (VUD) scheme, the proposed cooperative streaming scheme allows the
peers who are viewing different videos to cooperate with each other and mutually
improve the streaming performance.
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Chapter 5
Cooperation Stimulation Using Indirect Reciprocity Game Modeling
A cognitive network is a network composed of elements that can dynamically
adapt to varying network conditions to optimize end-to-end performance through
learning and reasoning [116]. In such a network, nodes are intelligent and have
the ability to observe, learn, and act to optimize their performance. Since nodes
generally belong to different authorities and pursue different goals, fully cooperative
behaviors, such as unconditionally forwarding packets for each other, cannot be
taken for granted. Instead, nodes will only cooperate with others when cooperation
can improve their own performance. We regard the nodes with such behaviors as
selfish nodes. Therefore, a key problem in cognitive networks is how to stimulate
cooperation among selfish nodes.
In the literature, many schemes have been proposed to stimulate node co-
operation for different cognitive networks, such as [23] [138] for ad hoc networks
and [121] [57] for peer-to-peer networks. One way to stimulate cooperation among
selfish nodes is to use payment based methods [139] [14]. Although these schemes
can achieve promising cooperation stimulation results, the requirement of tamper-
proof hardware or central billing services greatly limits their potential applications.
Another way to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes is to use reputation-
based methods with necessary monitoring [130] [88] [59]. Marti et. al [89] propose
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a mechanism, called “watchdog”, to identify the misbehaving nodes and another
mechanism, called “pathrater”, to deflect the traffics around them. The major
drawback of their method is that misbehaving nodes are not punished. Therefore,
there is no incentive for the nodes to cooperate. To overcome this problem, Bucheg-
ger and Boudec [22] as well as Michiardi and Molva [90] propose reputation-based
mechanisms to enforce node cooperation. In both approaches, nodes observe the be-
havior of each other, store this information locally, and distribute this information
in reputation reports. According to their observations, nodes isolate the misbehav-
ing nodes by denying forwarding packets to them. However, there is no theoretical
justification about the optimality of such approaches.
Recently, efforts have been made to mathematically analyzing cooperation in
cognitive networks using game theory [91] [42] [84] [128]. Srinivasan et al. [112]
propose to use generous TIT-FOR-TAT strategy while Urpi et al. [118] propose to
use Bayesian games. In [53], Felegyhazi et al. investigate equilibrium conditions
of packet forwarding strategies based on game theory and graph theory by taking
into account the network topology. In [131], Yu and Liu propose a game theoretic
framework to jointly analyze cooperation stimulation and security in autonomous
mobile ad hoc networks. Their results show that, for a two-player packet forwarding
game, the unique cheat-proof Nash equilibrium for every node is not to help the
opponent more than the opponent has helped him/her.
However, most of the existing game theoretical frameworks rely on the assump-
tion that the game between a pair of players is directly played for infinite times. In
reality, due to mobility or changes of environment, nodes will periodically update
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their partners to achieve better performance, which means that any pair of players
are supposed to play for only finite times with the termination time are either known
or can be estimated by both players. Note that every player can experience infinite
times with many players but never always with the same partner. In such a case,
according to the well known Prisoner’s Dilemma and backward induction princi-
ple [96], the only optimal strategy is to always play non-cooperatively. The major
reason causing such a non-cooperative optimal strategy is the implicit assumption of
direct reciprocity in most games, where the action of a player taking towards his/her
opponent is purely determined by the history of how the opponent treats him/her.
Obviously, under such a scenario, all players have no incentive to play cooperatively
since their behaviors will not be evaluated by other players except their opponents.
To stimulate the plays’ incentive to play cooperatively, not only the evaluations
from the opponents but also the evaluations from other observers should be taken
into account, which leads to the notion of “indirect reciprocity”. Indirect reciprocity
is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation and has recently drawn
a lot of attentions in the area of social science and evolutionary biology [93] [94].
The key concept of indirect reciprocity is “I help you not because you have helped
me but because you have helped others”. In this chapter, we propose to use the
indirect reciprocity game modelling to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes
for the scenario where the number of interactions between any pair of players are
finite. The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows.
• We propose a cooperation stimulation scheme to stimulate cooperation among
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selfish users in cognitive networks using indirect reciprocity game modelling.
Different from the existing game-theoretic approaches, our proposed scheme
does not rely on the assumption that the number of interactions between a
pair of players are infinite.
• In the proposed scheme, we first develop the concept of reputation distribu-
tion to capture not only the mean behavior of the transmitter’s reputation but
also all likelihoods of the transmitter’s reputation that may be. Then, we de-
velop a reputation updating policy for the receiver and observers to update the
transmitter’s reputation distribution based on the transmitter’s previous rep-
utation distribution and his/her action toward the receiver. We also propose
a gradient descent algorithm to find the stationary reputation distribution of
the whole population for any given optimal action rule.
• In the proposed scheme, we formulate the problem of finding the optimal
action rule as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) and proposed a modified
value iteration algorithm to find the optimal action rule.
• We show that with an appropriate cost-to-gain ratio, the strategy of forwarding
the number of packets that is equal to the reputation level of the receiver is
an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). We also show that even with only 60
percentage of population adopting the optimal action rule at the beginning,
by natural selection, the optimal action rule will quickly spread over the whole
population. And once the whole population use the optimal action rule, no





Figure 5.1: System model. Within every interaction, a pair of transmitter and re-
ceiver is randomly sampled from the population. Then, the transmitter will forward
a certain amount of packets to the receiver according to the receiver’s and his/her
own reputations. After the transmission, the transmitter’s reputation will be up-
dated by the receiver and the observers. Finally, the transmitter’s reputation is
propagated to the whole population from the receiver and the observers through a
noisy gossip channel.
society with more than 90 percentage of the population have good reputation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we describe the
problem formulation and introduce basic components in our system model. Then,
we show in details how to find the optimal action rule in Section 5.2. In Section
5.3, we describe two action spreading algorithms due to natural selection. Finally,
we show the simulation results in Section 5.4 and draw conclusions in Section 5.5.
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5.1 The System Model
As shown in Figure 5.1, let us consider a cognitive network with sufficiently
large population of nodes. Due to mobility and/or changes of environment, short
interactions rather than long-lasting associations between anonymous partners are
dominant. At each time slot, a fraction of players is chosen from the population to
form pairs to forward packets. Within each pair, one player acts as a transmitter
and the other player as a receiver. Let A = {0, 1, ..., L} stand for the action set
that the transmitter may choose, where the action i ∈ A stands for the transmitter
forwards i packets to the receiver.
In the simplest model with L = 1, the receiver can obtain a gain g at a cost c
to the transmitter. We should always assume that the gain g is greater than the cost
c. Otherwise, no transmission will occur. In such a case, if both players cooperate
with each other and forward one packet to the other player, both players receive
g − c, which is better than what they would obtain by both defecting, namely 0.
However, a unilateral defector would earn g, which is the highest payoff, and the
exploited cooperator would pay the cost c without receiving any benefit. The payoff
structure yields an instance of the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the
unique Nash equilibrium (NE) is defecting, i.e. both players will not forward the
packet to the other player. Moreover, with backward deduction, the NE remains
the same even the game is played a finite number of times. Such a non-cooperative
optimal strategy is mainly because of the use of direct reciprocity, where the action
of a transmitter taking towards a receiver is purely determined by the history of
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how the receiver treats him/her. Obviously, under such a scenario, all transmitters
have no incentive to forward packets since their behaviors will not be evaluated by
other players except their corresponding receivers.
To stimulate the cooperation under such a scenario, we use the indirect reci-
procity game modelling, where the essential concept is: “I help you not because you
have helped me but because you have helped others”. Therefore, a key concept in
indirect reciprocity game is the establishment of the notion of reputation, which is
the evaluation of the history of the players’ action. Here, to simplify the analysis,
we assume that the reputation is quantized to L + 1 levels with “0” being the worst
reputation and “L” being the best reputation, i.e., the reputation set can be repre-
sented as T = {0, 1, ..., L}. However, the results can be easily extended to the case
that the reputation set has different size from the action set. Here, we also assume
that everyone agrees on the reputation of an individual and no private opinions are
allowed. However, errors in assigning reputation are possible. During each inter-
action, the transmitter determines his action, i.e. how many packets to forward to
the receiver, based on the receiver’s and his/her own reputations. After each inter-
action, the reputation of the receiver remains the same, while the reputation of the
transmitter is first updated by the receiver and the observers, and propagated to the
whole population through a noisy gossip channel. Then, each participant (including
both the transmitter and receiver) goes back to the population with probability δ or
leaves the population with probability 1 − δ. The parameter δ can be treated as a
discounting factor of the future. For every player who leaves the population, a new
individual enters with an initial reputation randomly chosen from the reputation set
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A social norm, Q, is a matrix used for updating the immediate reputation of
players, where the immediate reputation is the reputation that a transmitter can
immediately obtain by taking an action. Each element Qi,j in the social norm stands
for the immediate reputation assigned to a transmitter who has taken the action
i toward a receiver whose reputation is j. Without loss of generality, we assume
that all players in the population share the same norm. Although the immediate
reputation is only determined by the action of the transmitter and the reputation
of the receiver, we can see from the later discussion, the final reputation updating
rule also involves the reputation of the transmitter.
Since both the cardinalities of the action set and the reputation set are L + 1,
there are (L + 1)(L+1)×(L+1) possible social norms. Based on the intuition that for-
warding packets to the receiver with good reputation or denying forwarding packets
to the receiver with bad reputation should receive good reputation, here, we define
the immediate reputation Qi,j as follows
Qi,j = L− |i− j|, (5.1)
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where “1” stands for good reputation and “0” stands for bad reputation.
With such a social norm shown in (5.3), we can see that the transmitter can
obtain a good immediate reputation by either forwarding packets to the receiver with
good reputation or denying forwarding packets to the receiver with bad reputation.
On the other hand, the transmitter will obtain a bad immediate reputation if he/she
either denies forwarding packets to the receiver with good reputation or forwards
packets to the receiver with bad reputation.
5.1.2 Action Rules
An action rule, a, is an action table of the transmitter, where the ith row and
jth column element ai,j stands for the action of the transmitter based on his/her
own reputation i and the corresponding receiver’s reputation j. Since both the
cardinalities of the action set and the reputation set are L + 1, there are (L +
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Channel
Figure 5.2: Reputation updating policy.
1)(L+1)×(L+1) possible action rules. The optimal action rule, a?, should be the one
that maximizes the payoff function as discussed later.
5.2 Optimal Action Rule
5.2.1 Reputation Updating Policy
A key concept in indirect reciprocity game is reputation [94]. There is a
similar notion of trust [115], however, which is mostly based on direct reciprocity.
Players monitor the social interactions within their group and help others establish
the reputation of being a helpful player. Therefore, one important step in indirect
reciprocity game modelling is how to update reputation based on players’ actions.
In this subsection, we develop a reputation updating policy based on the action of
the transmitter, the reputation of the transmitter and the reputation of the receiver.
To capture not only the mean behavior of the transmitter’s reputation but also
all likelihoods of the transmitter’s reputation that may be, we assign a reputation
distribution for each player. Let d = [d0, d1, ..., dL]
T be a reputation distribution for
a specific player. Then di stands for the likelihood of the player being assigned with
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reputation i.
The proposed reputation updating policy is shown in Fig. 5.2. Suppose, at
time index n, a transmitter with a reputation distribution dni is matched with a
receiver with a reputation distribution dnj . By taking a certain action, the transmit-
ter is assigned with an immediate reputation d̂
n
i based on the social norm. Then,
the receiver and the observers will update the transmitter’s reputation distribution
using a linear combination of the transmitter’s original and immediate reputations,
where the weight λ can be treated as a discounting factor of the past reputation.
Finally, the transmitter’s reputation is propagated among the population by the
receiver and observers through a noisy gossip channel.
In a simple example, we assume that the transmitter’s reputation distribution
is dni = ei and the receiver’s reputation distribution is d
n
j = ej, where ei and ej are
the standard basis vectors. Let ai,j be the action the transmitter takes towards the
receiver. Then, the immediate reputation of the transmitter is eQai,j ,j . According to




λei + (1− λ)eQai,j ,j
)
, (5.4)
where PN is the transition matrix of the noisy channel. Without loss of generality
1,
1Note that the analysis in this chapter are also applicable to the PN with other forms.
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with µ ∈ [0, 0.5] being a constant.
The dn+1i in (5.4) is the updated reputation distribution of the transmitter
after the transmitter with an original reputation ei takes an action ai,j towards
the receiver with a reputation ej. Since this updated reputation distribution will
be used later in the analysis for finding the optimal action rule, we use a specific
symbol d̃i→j to denote it, i.e.,
d̃i→j = PN
(
λei + (1− λ)eQai,j ,j
)
. (5.6)
For the general case that dni 6= ei and/or dnj 6= ej, the transmitter’s updated
reputation distribution cannot be simply expressed using (5.4) since, given an action
rule, different combinations of the transmitter’s and receiver’s reputations may lead












Then, according to Fig. 5.2, the transmitter’s updated reputation distribution
can be computed by
dn+1i = PN
(






5.2.2 Stationary Reputation Distribution
Let x = [x0, x1, ..., xL]
T stand for the reputation distribution of the entire
population, where xi is the portion of the population that have the reputation i.
Since every pair of transmitter and receiver is chosen from the population, given
the transmitter with reputation i, the probability of matching with the receiver
with reputation k is xk. After the transmission, the reputation of the transmitter
is updated using the policy shown in Fig.5.2. Therefore, the evolution of x can be
described by the following differential equation
dx
dt
= xnew − x, (5.9)
where xnew is the new reputation distribution of the entire population and can be
computed by
xnew = PN (λI + (1− λ)PT )x, (5.10)
with the ith row and jth column element of the matrix PT being defined as






According to (5.9), (5.10), and (5.11), the stationary reputation distribution
x? is the solution to the following equation
PN (λI + (1− λ)PT )x? = x?. (5.12)
From (5.11) and (5.12), we can see that, given the optimal action a?, the
stationary reputation distribution can be found by solving the nonlinear equations
in (5.12). In Algorithm 3, we propose a gradient descent algorithm for finding the
stationary reputation distribution given the optimal action rule.
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Algorithm 3 : Finding Stationary Reputation Distribution Using Gradi-
ent Descent
1. Given the optimal action a?i,j , ∀i, ∀j, the tolerance η0 = 0.01, the index t = 0, and step





T , set ε = 1, and let
F(x) = PN (λI + (1− λ)PT (x))x− x.
2. while ε > η0
• Compute the updating vector ∆xt+1 using ∆xt+1 = −α×∇F(xt)× F(xt).
• Update xt+1 by xt+1 = xt + ∆xt+1.
• Normalize xt+1 using xt+1 = xt+1||xt+1||2 .
• Update the parameter ε by ε = ||xt+1 − xt||2.
• Update the index t = t + 1.
End
3. The stationary reputation distribution is x? = xt.
5.2.3 Payoff Function
Suppose that the cost of forwarding a packet is a constant, c, the total cost of
the transmitter with reputation i taking action ai,j towards a receiver with reputa-
tion j is given by
C(ai,j) = ai,jc. (5.13)
Similarly, if the gain of receiving a packet is a constant, g, the total gain of
the receiver with reputation i can be computed by
G(aj,i) = aj,ig, (5.14)
where aj,i is the action of the corresponding transmitter with reputation j.
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Let Wi,j denote the maximum payoff that a player, currently having reputation
i and being matched with a player with reputation j, can gain from this interaction
to future. Obviously, if the player with reputation i serves as a transmitter, then
the long-term expected payoff that he/she can obtain by taking action ai,j would be






where the first term ai,jc is the immediate cost the transmitter incurred by taking





?(l)Wk,l stands for the benefit he
gains in the future with a discounting factor δ. According to (5.6), by taking action
ai,j, the reputation distribution of the transmitter will change from ei to d̃i→j. Since
his opponent in the next round is randomly sampled from the population with a sta-
tionary reputation distribution x?, with probability d̃i→j(k)x?(l), the transmitter’s
reputation becomes k and his opponent’s reputation is l.
On the other hand, if the player with reputation i serves as a receiver, the







where the first term a?j,ig is the immediate gain he/she can obtain when the trans-




l Wi,l stands for the
benefit he gains in the future with a discounting factor δ. As a receiver, the reputa-
tion will not change after the transmission. Since his opponent in the next round is
randomly sampled from the population with a stationary reputation distribution x?,
with probability x?(l), the receiver’s reputation is i and his opponent’s reputation
is l.
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With each interaction, the play acts either as a transmitter or as a receiver
with equal probability 1
2











































From (5.17) and (5.18), we can see that the problem of finding the optimal
action rule is a Markov Decision Process (MDP), where the state is the reputation
pair (i, j), the action is ai,j, the transition probability is determined by d̃i→j and x?,
and the reward is determined by c and g. Therefore, given the stationary reputa-
tion distribution, the optimal action can be found by solving (5.18) using dynamic
programming. In this chapter, we propose a modified value iteration algorithm to
find the optimal action given stationary reputation distribution, which is shown in
Algorithm 4.
5.2.4 Optimal Action Using An Alternative Algorithm
From the previous two subsections, we can see that given the optimal action,
the stationary reputation distribution can be found using Algorithm 3, and given
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the stationary reputation distribution, the optimal action can be found using Algo-
rithm 4. Therefore, we can obtain the optimal action and the stationary reputation
distribution alternatively by iteratively fixing one and solving the other. The de-
tailed processes are summarized in Algorithm 5. Note that the convergence speed of
Algorithm 5 is highly determined by the initial action rule a0. Nevertheless, it will
converge since the number of the possible action rules is finite. Moreover, Algorithm
5 can also be used to test the evolutionary stability of any action rule. The idea is
to set the tested action rule as the initial action rule and see whether it can converge
in one iteration. The details will be discussed in Section 5.4.
5.3 Action Spreading Due To Natural Selection
Based on Algorithm 5, we can find the optimal action rule and the stationary
reputation distribution. However, during the above analysis, we do not include
the perturbation effect, where players may take non-optimal action rule due to
uncertainty of the system and/or the incorrect (noisy) parameters. Taking the
perturbation effect into account, we need to evaluate the stability of the optimal
action rule. Here, we adopt the concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
[110], which is “a strategy such that, if all members of the population adopt it,
then no mutant strategy could invade the population under the influence of natural
selection”. In the following subsections, we first discuss, by natural selection, how
the action rules spread over the population. Specifically, we discuss two action
spreading algorithms: one is action spreading algorithm using Wright-Fisher model
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[54] and the other is action spreading algorithm using replicator dynamic equation
[110]. Then, we examine, in Section 5.4, the stability of the optimal action rule
derived by Algorithm 5 by the simulations.
Let M be the number of action rules, a1, a2, ..., aM , used in the population.





i = 1. Let U
t
i be the average payoff using action rule ai at time t.
5.3.1 Action Spreading Algorithm Using Wright Fisher Model
The Wright-Fisher model is by far the most popular stochastic model for re-
production in population genetics [54]. It is based on the assumption that the prob-
ability of an individual adopting a certain strategy is proportional to the expected
payoff of the population using that strategy. Due to its simplicity and capability of
capturing the essence of the biology involved, we use the Wright-Fisher model here
to characterize how action rules spread over the population.
Let yi be the probability of an individual using action ai. Then, we have
∑M
i=1 yi = 1. With the Wright-Fisher Model, we assume that yi is proportional to











where the numerator ptiU
t







j is the total payoff of the whole population, which is the
normalization term that ensures
∑M
i=1 yi = 1.
Based on the assumption that the population size is sufficiently large, the per-
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centage of the population using action ai is equal to the probability of an individual











5.3.2 Action Spreading Algorithm Using Replicator Dynamic Equa-
tion
Replicator dynamic equation is widely used to characterize the population
evolution in evolutionary game theory [110]. It is based on the following intuition:
if a certain strategy results in a higher payoff than the average level, the population
share using that strategy will grow with the growth rate proportional to the dif-
ference between the expected payoff of the population using that strategy and the
expected payoff of the entire population. In this subsection, we use the replicator
dynamic equation to model the evolution of the percentage of the population using












where η is a scale factor controlling the speed of the evolution.













































































Figure 5.3: The population evolution when L = 1, g = 1 and c = 0.1: (a) the
percentage of the population with reputation L = 1; (b) the percentage of the
population using optimal action shown in (5.24).
5.4 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and Simulations
To verify the proposed algorithm, we simulate the packet forwarding game.
We study a fixed-size population, N = 1000. Each new player receives an initial
reputation, which is randomly chosen from {0, 1, ..., L} with equal probability 1
L+1
.
Each player uses one of (L + 1)(L+1)×(L+1) possible action rules. All players in the
population share the fixed social norm defined in (5.2). Before any one elementary
step of action updating, each individual has exactly 20 interactions with other ran-
domly chosen individuals. Individuals act as transmitter and receiver on average
10 times each. After each interaction, the reputation of the transmitter is updated
according to the reputation updating policy shown in Fig. 5.2. We assume that
every player in the population agrees on the reputation generated by the reputation
updating policy. No private lists of reputation are considered. After all 20 interac-
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tions have taken place, each participant including both the transmitter and receiver
goes back to the population with probability δ or leaves the population with proba-
bility 1− δ. For every player who leaves, a new individual enters the population to
keep the total population size constant. The initial reputation of the new coming is
randomly chosen from {0, 1, ..., L} with equal probability 1
L+1
. Then, the players in
the population, including the old players who stay in the population and the new
players who enter the population, choose their new action rules according to previ-
ous payoff history of the whole population. There are two possible action spreading
algorithms as shown in the previous section. One is the action spreading algorithm
using Wright Fisher Model, which is denoted as “WFM”, and the other one is the
action spreading algorithm using Replicator Dynamic Equation, which is denoted
as “RDE”. After updating the action rule, the payoffs of all players are reset to
zero. Therefore, older players do not accumulate their payoffs. In all the following
simulations, the parameters λ, δ, and µ are set to be 0.5, 0.9, and 0.95 respectively.
The parameter η that controls the speed of the evolution in RDE is set to be 0.1.
5.4.1 Binary Reputation Scenario
To give more insights into the proposed algorithm, we first evaluate the binary
reputation scenario where L = 1. We assume that the gain per unit is 1 and the
cost per unit is 0.1, i.e. g = 1 and c = 0.1. According to Algorithm 5, with different






Figure 5.4: The stable region for the optimal action rule shown in (5.24) when
L = 1.










































1), the transmitter will not forward any packet to the receiver re-
gardless his/her own reputation and the corresponding receiver’s reputation. Obvi-
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Figure 5.5: The population evolution when L = 1, g = 1 and c = 0.6: (a) the
percentage of the population with reputation L = 1; (b) the percentage of the
population using optimal action shown in (5.24).
ously, it is a bad strategy since, with such a strategy, there is no cooperation and






3) are symmetric where
with the former pair, the transmitter will always forward packets to the receiver who
has good reputation, and with the latter pair, the transmitter will always forward
packets to the receiver who has bad reputation. We can also find that the pair
(x?2,a
?
2) leads to a population with more than 90 percentage of the players are good
reputation while (x?3,a
?
3) leads to a population with more than 90 percentage of the
players are bad reputation. Here, we prefer (x?2,a
?
2) since it leads to a “good” society
with more than 90 percentage of the population are good reputation.
Then, we evaluate the evolutionary stability of (x?2,a
?
2). In the simulation, the
initial frequency of the optimal action rule a? shown in (5.24) is set to be 0.6. The
initial frequencies of the other action rules are randomly chosen. The initial repu-




Fig. 5.3 (a), we show the evolutionary results of the percentage of the population
with reputation level L = 1. From Fig. 5.3 (a), we can see that for both WFM
and RDE, the reputation distribution converges to the stationary reputation dis-
tribution x?2. Compared with WFM, the convergence speed of RDE is a bit slower
since a small speed controlling parameter η = 0.1 is used in RDE.
The evolutionary results of the percentage of the population using the action
rule a?2 are shown in Fig. 5.3 (b). From Fig. 5.3 (b), we can see that for both WFM
and RDE, the action rule a?2 will spread over the whole population. And once the
whole population adopt a?2, no one will deviate. Therefore, the action rule a
?
2 is an
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) [110] in this case.
From (5.17), we can see that the optimal action rule is determined by the
values of g and c. Intuitively, if g À c, every player is willing to cooperate with
other players since in such a scenario, the potential cooperation gain will be greater
than the immediate cooperation cost. On the other hand, if c À g, every player
tends not to cooperate with other players since the potential cooperation gain will
be smaller than the immediate cooperation cost in such a scenario. Based on the
intuition, there should exist a critical cost-to-gain ratio γ such that the optimal
action rule a?2 is stable if c < γg and is not stable otherwise.
By setting a?2 as the initial action rule a
0 in Algorithm 5 and varying g and c,
we find that if c
g
≤ 0.582, the optimal action rule found by Algorithm 5 is a?2. On
the other hand, if c
g
> 0.582, the optimal action rule changes to be a?1. Therefore,
the critical cost-to-gain ratio γ is equal to 0.582 in this case, which means that the







Figure 5.6: The stable region for the optimal action rule shown in (5.26) when
L = 4.
We verify the above statement by evaluating the stability of a?2 when g = 1
and c = 0.6. The corresponding evolutionary results are shown in Fig. 5.5. From
Fig. 5.5 (b), we can see that when c
g
= 0.6 > 0.582, the percentage of the population
using action rule a?2 does not converge to 1 for both WFM and RDE. Therefore,
a?2 is not stable in this case. Correspondingly, we can also see from Fig. 5.5 (a) that
the reputation distribution does not converge to x?2 in this case.
5.4.2 Multi-Level Reputation Scenario
For the multi-level reputation scenario where L ≥ 2, due to the large dimension
of the action space ((L + 1)(L+1)×(L+1)), it is difficult to find all the possible pairs of
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Figure 5.7: The population evolution when L = 4, g = 1 and c = 0.5: (a) the
percentage of the population with reputation L = 4; (b) the percentage of the
population using optimal action shown in (5.26).
stationary reputation distribution x? and optimal action rule a?. However, based on
the results in the binary reputation scenario, we can infer that one possible optimal
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According to Algorithm 3, we can find the corresponding stationary reputation





0.0235 0.0235 0.0235 0.0235 0.906
)T
. (5.27)
Then, similar to the binary reputation scenario, we obtain the stable region for
the optimal action rule a?0. By setting a
?
0 as the initial action rule a
0 in Algorithm
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Figure 5.8: The population evolution when L = 4, g = 1 and c = 0.7: (a) the
percentage of the population with reputation L = 4; (b) the percentage of the
population using optimal action shown in (5.26).
5 and varying g and c, we find that if c
g
≤ 0.622, the optimal action rule found by
Algorithm 5 is still a?0. On the other hand, if
c
g
> 0.622, the optimal action rule
changes. Therefore, the critical cost-to-gain ratio γ in this case is equal to 0.622,
which means that the stable region for a?0 is the shadow region shown in Fig. 5.6.
We then verify the above statement by simulating the packet forwarding game
with two different cost-to-gain ratio settings. One is g = 1 and c = 0.5, i.e. c
g
=
0.5 < 0.622, and the other is g = 1 and c = 0.7, i.e. c
g
= 0.7 > 0.622. The
evolutionary results for the former setting are shown in Fig. 5.7. From Fig. 5.7, we
can see that when the cost-to-gain ratio is set to be c
g
= 0.5 < 0.622, the reputation
distribution converges to x?0 and the optimal action rule a
?
0 spreads over the whole
population for both WFM and RDE, which verifies that a?0 is an ESS in this case.
The evolutionary results for the latter cost-to-gain ratio setting are different
and shown in Fig. 5.8. From Fig. 5.8, we can see that when the cost-to-gain ratio
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is set to be c
g
= 0.7 > 0.622, for both WFM and RDE, the action rule a?0 does not
spread over the whole population and the reputation distribution does not converge
to x?0. Therefore, a
?
0 is not stable in this case.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a cooperation stimulation scheme for cognitive
networks using indirect reciprocity game modelling. Different from the existing
game theoretic approaches, our proposed scheme does not rely on the assumption
that the number of interactions between a pair of players are infinite. From the
simulation results, we can see that with a proper cost-to-gain ratio, the action rule
of forwarding i packets to the receiver with reputation level i is an ESS. Even
starting with only 60 percentage of population adopting the optimal action rule,
the optimal action rule will quickly spread over the whole population by natural
selection. And once the whole population use the optimal action rule, no one will
deviate. Moreover, such an ESS will lead to a “good” society where more than 90
percentage of the population have good reputation.
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Algorithm 4 : Modified Value Iteration For Optimal Action Selection
Given Stationary Reputation Distribution
1. Given the stationary reputation x?, tolerance η0 = 0.01, initialize a?i,j with a
0
i,j ∀i ∀j, set
ε1 = 1 and ε2 = 1.
2. while ε1 > η0
• Set ε2 = 1.
• Initialize Wi,j = 0 ∀i ∀j.
• while ε2 > η0
– Compute d̃i→j using d̃i→j = PN
(
λei + (1− λ)eQai,j ,j
)
.
























– Compute âi,j using














– Update the parameter ε2 by ε2 = ||Ŵ−W||2.
– Update W by W = Ŵ.
– End
• Update the parameter ε1 by ε1 = ||â− a?||2.
• Update a? by a? = â.
End
3. The optimal action is a?.
117
Algorithm 5 : An Alternative Algorithm For Finding Stationary Repu-
tation Distribution And Optimal Action
1. Given the tolerance η0 = 0.01, initialize a? with a0 and set ε = 1.
2. while ε > η0
• Given the optimal action a?, finding the stationary reputation distribution x? using Al-
gorithm 3.
• Given the stationary reputation distribution x?, finding the optimal action â? using Al-
gorithm 4.
• Update the parameter ε by ε = ||â? − a?||2.
• Update a? by a? = â?.
End




During the processes of being captured, digitized, recorded, and transmitted,
an image is usually distorted and noisy. Such a noisy image is visually annoying
and often not suited to further perform tasks such as segmentation, recognition and
compression. Therefore, image denoising is a very important issue to reconstruct a
good estimate of the original image from the noisy observations.
Many approaches have been proposed in the literature to reconstruct the orig-
inal image by exploiting the inherently spatial correlation. By assuming that the
image locally satisfies a stationary Gaussian process, Woods and Radewan [126]
propose to estimate the original image from the noisy image using Kalman filter
while Jin et al [70] propose to use adaptive Wiener filter. In both approaches, the
first-order and second-order statistics used in the filters are calculated based on the
noisy samples within a local window. In [111] [51] [117], the authors propose to
use bilateral filtering over the local neighborhood samples, where the weights of
the bilateral filters are computed based on the intensity and radiometric distances
between the center sample and the neighboring samples. Another class of locally
adaptive image denoising approaches are derived by considering image processing as
a variational problem where the restored image is computed by minimizing a care-
fully designed energy function [26] [55] [56]. Typically, such energy functions consist
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of a fidelity term that is determined by the difference between the reconstructed
image and the noisy image, and a regularization penalty term that is determined by
the image prior.
To further exploit the spatial correlation, Buades et al [20] proposed to average,
in a weighted manner, all the pixels in a nonlocal window instead of only involving
the locally neighboring pixels, where the weights are determined by the differences
between the region centered by the target pixel and the regions centered by the
candidate pixels. Since the weights are not determined by the radiometric (physical)
distance, similar pixels that are far away from the target pixel can still be awarded
large weights. In such a way, the denoising performance is greatly improved. Several
extensions of the nonlocal approach are also proposed [21] [73] [74].
Besides the pixel-domain approaches, transform-domain approaches are also
investigated [50] [99] [58] [66]. The transform-domain approaches are mainly based
on the assumption that the original signal can be well approximated by a linear
combination of few basis, i.e., the original signal is sparse in the transform-domain.
In such a case, the original signal can be well estimated by preserving the few
high-magnitude transform coefficients that convey mostly the energy of the original
signal and discarding the rest which are mainly introduced by the noise. Therefore,
one important issue in the transform-domain approaches is how to threshold the
transform coefficients. Many threshold rules have been proposed from different
speculations [50] [11] [52]. A combination of the nonlocal and transform-domain
thresholding ideas is proposed in [45]. The basic idea is to first group similar 2D
image blocks into 3D data arrays, then perform 3D wavelet transform, and finally
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shrinkage the transform spectrum.
Most of the existing schemes focus on how to choose good weights for some
given neighborhoods to achieve better reconstructions. However, how to adaptively
choose optimal neighborhoods can be even more important since too large a neigh-
borhood set may cause overly-smooth artifacts, while too small a neighborhood
set may not be able to efficiently reduce noise variance. Due to the absence of
the original image, the Stein’s principle [113] is used to estimate the true MSE for
determining the optimal neighborhoods. Nevertheless, we find that there exists a
trade-off between the accuracy of the estimate and the minimum of the true MSE.
In this chapter, we study the impact of this trade-off and formulate the image de-
noising problem as a coalition formation game. In this game, every pixel is treated
as a player, who tries to seek partners to form a coalition to improve the accu-
racy of the Stein’s estimate while incurring a cost of increasing the minimum of the
true MSE. Since finding the optimal coalition structures is NP-hard, we propose a
heuristically distributed algorithm in solving the coalition formation game. We also
show that the traditional approaches that use a heuristically determined candidate
set are special cases of the proposed game theoretical framework by choosing the
utility function without a cost term. Finally, experimental results show that the
proposed game theoretical approach can achieve better performance than the non-
local method in terms of both PSNR and visual quality. Note that the proposed
game is also applicable in other scenarios besides the nonlocal method as long as 1)
there exist some locally adaptive parameters to be estimated, and 2) the estimation
accuracy will be improved when more samples are involved in the estimate process.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, we give a
brief description of the system model and the coalition formation game. Then,
we discuss how to choose a good candidate set in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3,
we study the trade-off between the accuracy of the estimate and the minimum of
the true MSE and provide a detailed analysis of the proposed game-theoretic image
denoising framework. In Section 6.4, we show the relationship between the proposed
game-theoretic framework and the traditional candidate set selection approaches.
Finally, we illustrate the experimental results on real images in Section 6.5 and
draw conclusions in Section 6.6.
6.1 The System Model and Coalition Formation Game
6.1.1 The System Model
In this chapter, we consider the problem of restoring images degraded by
additive white Gaussian noise. The degraded process can be modelled as
In(k) = I(k) + n(k), (6.1)
where I is the original image, In is the noisy observation of the image, and n is the
additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and σ2 noise variance. The k = (k1, k2) is
the coordinate of a pixel. The problem is to find an estimate Î of the original image
based on the noisy observation In.
It is well known that the image denoising problem is ill-posed. To reconstruct
the original image from the noisy observation, we need to use some prior information
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such as the correlations among spatial neighboring pixels. In this chapter, we focus
on the spatially adaptive linear filtering approach. For the pixel located at k, we








where S(k) is the candidate set that contains the spatially neighboring pixels for k,
and wk,l is the weight for pixel I
n(l).
6.1.2 The Coalition Formation Game
Game theory is a mathematical tool that analyzes the strategic interactions
among multiple decision makers. A game is mainly composed by three components:
• a finite set of players, denoted by u1, u2, ..., uN ;
• a set of actions, denoted by Ai, for each player ui;
• payoff/utility function, denoted by Ui, which measures the outcome for player
ui determined by the actions of all players.
A coalition formation game is a game where the players seek to form coopera-
tive groups, i.e., coalitions, to strengthen their positions in the game. The players’
actions in the coalition formation game are whom to cooperate with, i.e., which
players to form coalitions with. The payoff/utility function in the coalition for-
mation game is defined over coalitions, called coalition value. The coalition value,
which quantifies the worth of a coalition, is mainly determined by two terms: the
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gain and the cost. By forming a coalition, every player in the coalition can obtain
a gain through cooperation within the coalition. However, the gain is limited by a
cooperation cost for forming the coalition, e.g. the negotiation cost or information
exchange cost.
Given the player set and the coalition value, the coalition formation game
is uniquely defined, and the outcome of the game is a set of coalitions, which is
the optimal partitions of the player set. To obtain the optimal partitions, there
are two possible approaches: centralized approach and distributed approach. For
the centralized approach, the centralized controller needs to search over all the
partitions of the player set to find the optimal partitions, which is NP-complete
and impractical when the size of the player set is large [104]. For the distributed
approach, the players will make their own decisions as to whether or not they join a
coalition. One typical approach is to use the merge and split rules proposed in [15].
This approach starts with an initial partition and repeats alternatively the merge
and split rule, 1) merge rule: merge any set of coalitions into a single coalition
if the new coalition can provide larger total coalition values; 2) split rule: split a
coalition into smaller coalitions if the resulting smaller coalitions can provide larger
total coalition values.
In Section 6.3, we will discuss in details how to use the coalition formation
game to formulate the image denoising problem, where each pixel will be treated as
a player seeking to form coalitions to achieve optimal denosing performance.
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6.2 Candidate Set Selection
From (6.2), we can see that the reconstruction performance are determined by
the selection of the weights wk,l and the candidate set S(k). For any given S(k), the
optimal weights w?k,l(S(k)) are determined by the correlation between pixels I(k)
and I(l), and should be chosen to minimize the difference between the estimation
Î(k) and the original pixel I(k) as below.









Note that when the optimal weights in (6.3) are used, the selection of the
candidate set S(k) is trivial since the accuracy of the reconstruction improves as
the candidate set S(k) becomes larger. The proof can be found in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: When the optimal weights in (6.3) are used, the accuracy of the
reconstruction improves as the candidate set S(k) becomes larger. Proof : Let S1(k)
and S2(k) be two candidate sets with S1(k) ⊂ S2(k). Let w?k,l(S1(k)) and w?k,l(S2(k))
be the corresponding optimal weights computed by (6.3). Suppose w̃k,l(S2(k)) are





w?k,l(S1(k)), l ∈ S1(k);
0, else.
(6.4)























Therefore, when optimal weights are used, the reconstruction using candidate
set S2(k) is more accurate than that using candidate set S1(k).
However, due to the absence of the original pixel I(k), it is impossible for us
to find the optimal weights using (6.3). One possible approximation is to use the










where B is a predefined neighborhood and h is the parameter related to the noise’s
variance.
Nevertheless, since the weights in (6.6) are not optimal, the selection of the
candidate set S(k) for the reconstruction becomes critically important. On one
hand, if the size of the candidate set is too small, then the noise may not be effectively
removed. On the other hand, if the size of the candidate set is too large, then the
reconstruction may be overly-smooth. Moreover, according to (6.6), we can see
that the pixels that are more similar to the target pixel would have larger weights.
To prevent the reconstruction from being overly-smooth, we will only involve the
pixels that have relatively large weights. Let Ω(m) stand for the subset of S(k)
which contains the pixels with the first m largest weights. Then, the reconstruction







Obviously, the parameter m in (6.7) should be chosen in such a way that the
difference between Î(k,m) and I(k) is minimized, i.e., the optimal m? can be found
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 6.1: An example of optimal candidate set with an edge region: (a) original
image; (b) noisy image with σ = 15; (c) noisy image with σ = 25; (d) noisy image
with σ = 35; (e) the candidate set used by nonlocal; (f) the ideally optimal candidate
set of (b) when the original signal is available; (g) the ideally optimal candidate set
of (c) when the original signal is available; (h) the ideally optimal candidate set of
(d) when the original signal is available.
by
m? = arg min
m
|Î(k,m)− I(k)|2. (6.8)
In general, m? is content dependent, i.e., m? may be different for different
k and/or different noise variances. Even with the same m?, the structure of the
candidate set Ω(m?) may be different for different pixels. In Figs. 6.1 and 6.2, we
show the structure of the optimal candidate set for two different scenarios: 1) the
target pixel is centered within an edge region, and 2) the target pixel is centered
within a smooth region. For illustration purpose, we assume that the original image
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is available for finding m? in these two examples. Later in Section 6.3, we will discuss
how to find m? using game theory under the scenario that the original image is not
available. As shown in Figs. 6.1 and 6.2, (a) is the original image centered by
the target pixel, which is denoted by red “x”, (b)-(d) are the noisy images with σ
being 15, 25, and 35 respectively. (e) is the candidate set using in [20], which is
a square window. (f)-(h) are the optimal candidate sets generated using (6.8) for
(b)-(d) respectively. Note that the black pixels in (f)-(h) stand for the pixels in
the candidate set. From Figs. 6.1 and 6.2, we can see that for the scenario where
the target pixel is centered within an edge region, the candidate set has an edge
structure, while for the scenario where the target pixel is centered within a smooth
region, the structure of the candidate set is unpredictable. Moreover, we can also see
that with different noise variance, the candidate sets are quite different. Therefore,
the candidate set should not be pre-defined in a fixed way such as using a square
window in [20]. Instead, the candidate set should be chosen adaptively to minimize
the difference between the estimate and the original signal.
6.3 Game Theoretical Problem Formulation
6.3.1 Stein’s unbiased risk estimate (SURE)
Since I(k) is unknown, the optimal m? can not be explicitly computed using
(6.5). Fortunately, we can first use the Stein’s unbiased risk estimate (SURE) [113]
to estimate the true mean squared error (MSE) from the noisy observation and then
use the estimated MSE to find the optimal m?.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 6.2: An example of optimal candidate set with a smooth region: (a) original
image; (b) noisy image with σ = 15; (c) noisy image with σ = 25; (d) noisy image
with σ = 35; (e) the candidate set used by nonlocal; (f) the ideally optimal candidate
set of (b) when the original signal is available; (g) the ideally optimal candidate set
of (c) when the original signal is available; (h) the ideally optimal candidate set of
(d) when the original signal is available.
In Fig. 6.3, we show the optimal m? obtained using (6.8) for lena image when
the standard deviation of the noise is σ = 10, where the intensity stands for the
optimal m? value. From Fig. 6.3, we can see that there are many pixels have the
similar m? value, which can be grouped together for finding m?. For example, the
pixels in the red circles have the m? value near 60 can be grouped together. Suppose
that the whole image is partitioned into M subsets Φ = {Φ1, Φ2, ..., ΦM}, where each
subset Φi contains a set of pixels that may not be physical neighboring but have the
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8 441 6 28 310 296 26 441 
5 138 49 16 6 389 225 441 
58 177 88 28 6 441 240 23 
37 62 12 191 312 3 7 1 
71 93 315 72 441 10 58 441 
441 5 252 35 441 8 144 441 
85 254 10 36 12 185 14 51 
306 2 2 20 10 59 60 155 
Figure 6.3: The optimal m? for lena image when σ = 10.
same optimal parameter m?i , i.e.,












|Î(k,m?i )− I(k)|2, (6.10)


























































, l− k ∈ B.
(6.13)
Theorem 2: The SUREi in (6.11) is an unbiased estimator of the true MSE
msei in (6.10), i.e,
E[SUREi] = E[msei]. (6.14)
















































































Figure 6.4: The trade-off between the confidence term C and the distortion term D:
(a) the performance of C with different N ; (b) the performance of D with different
N .



















6.3.2 Confidence and Distortion Trade-off
6.3.2.1 Confidence
From Theorem 2, we can see that SUREi is an unbiased estimator of msei.
However, there can be some mismatch between SUREi and msei for each realization
(noise observation), i.e., SUREi is just an approximation of msei. To measure the
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accuracy of the approximation, let us define the confidence term, C, as the average






|Φi| × |msei − SUREi|. (6.17)
According to [113], the estimator SUREi becomes closer to msei as |Φi| in-
creases, which means that the confidence term C in (6.17) decreases as |Φi| increases.
6.3.2.2 Distortion
With the partition Φ = {Φ1, Φ2, ..., ΦM} and the optimal parameters {m?1,m?2, ..., m?M},







According to the analysis in Section 6.3.1, we group the pixels with similar m?
values together and assign a common m?i to all pixels in subset Φi. In such a case,
as |Φi| increases, the probability that the pixels in Φi have different true m? values
increases, which leads to the increase of msei. Therefore, the distortion term D in
(6.18) increases as |Φi| increases.
6.3.2.3 Confidence and Distortion Trade-off
From the above discussion, we can see that as |Φi| increases, the confidence
term C decreases but the distortion term D increases. Therefore, there exists a
trade-off between C and D. To verify such a trade-off, we conduct a simple ex-
periment by setting |Φi| = N, ∀i. As shown in Figure 6.4, the confidence term C
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Figure 6.5: Some possible gain functions.
decrease as N increases while the distortion term D increases as N increases, which
are consistent with our analysis.
6.3.3 Utility Function and Solution to the Game
From the previous subsections, we can see that given the partition Φ =
{Φ1, Φ2, ..., ΦM}, SURE can be used to approximate the true MSE to find the opti-
mal m?. However, how to find a good partition is not trivial since the number of the
partition is not fixed and the size of each partition can vary. Due to the uncertainty
of the number of the partition, the traditional segmentation and clustering meth-




Figure 6.6: The four tested images: (a) Lena; (b) Barbara; (c) Boat; (d) Flinstones.
the dynamic partition formation process, we propose to use the coalition formation
game.
In this game theoretical formulation, every pixel is treated as a player, who
tries to seek partners to form coalitions to achieve better reconstruction. By forming
a coalition, every player in the coalition can obtain a gain of reducing the difference
between the SURE and the true estimate, i.e., the confidence term in (6.17), while
incurring a cost of increasing the minimum of the MSE. With this idea in mind, we
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define the utility for a coalition as:
U(Φi) = −|Φi| × SUREi + g(|Φi|, σ2), (6.19)
where the first term of the right hand side is the cost and the second term g(|Φi|, σ2)
is the gain.
The function g(|Φi|, σ2) in (6.19) characterizes the gain of forming a coalition,
which is the reduction of the difference between the SURE and the true estimate
due to the increase of the coalition size. Therefore, g(|Φi|, σ2) should satisfy the
following properties
1. g(|Φi|, σ2) should be an increasing function in terms of |Φi| since the gain
increases as the coalition size |Φi| increases, i.e., ∂g(|Φi|,σ
2)
∂|Φi| > 0.
2. g(|Φi|, σ2) should be a concave function in terms of |Φi| since a certain increase
of the coalition size in the low |Φi| region should lead to a more significant
gain than that in the high |Φi| region, i.e., ∂
2g(|Φi|,σ2)
∂|Φi|2 < 0.
3. g(|Φi|, σ2) should be a superadditive function since the gain of a large coalition
should be no smaller than that of two sub coalitions, i.e., g(|Φi + Φj|, σ2) ≥
g(|Φi|, σ2) + g(|Φj|, σ2).
4. g(|Φi|, σ2) should be a decreasing function in terms of σ2 since the gain de-




There are many functions that can satisfy the above property. In the following,
we list three possible functions




















where λ1, λ2, and λ3 are fixed parameters.
In Fig. 6.5, we plot the three possible gain functions versus |Φi| by setting
σ2 = 1. We can see that all the three functions meet our requirements and are
therefore valid gain functions. Moreover, we can see that all three functions behave
similarly. Therefore, in this chapter, we only evaluate the first gain function, i.e.,
g(|Φi|, σ2) in (6.19) is set to be g1(|Φi|, σ2). Nevertheless, similar results can be
obtained with the other two functions (g2(|Φi|, σ2) and g3(|Φi|, σ2)) and any other
functions with similar properties.
With the utility function in (6.19), we can see that as the size of the coalition
increases, the members in the coalition can obtain gains from g(|Φi|, σ2). However,
the gains are limited by the a cost of forming the coalition, which is −|Φi|×SUREi.
The problem now is to find the optimal coalition structures based on the utility func-
tion in (6.19). One possible approach is to use the merge and split rules proposed
in [15], where the authors prove that their algorithm will converge to a unique solu-
tion with arbitrary merge and split iterations. However, the computation complexity
is still very large since all possible sub-partitions need to be evaluated during the
split process. To make the problem traceable, in this chapter, we propose a heuris-
tic algorithm in solving the coalition formation game. As shown in Algorithm 6,
the proposed heuristic algorithm starts with a randomly chosen pixel and finds the
coalition by selecting the neighborhoods that can give best average utility. Then, all
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the pixels in the coalition are denoised with the corresponding optimal m?. Finally,
all the pixels in the coalition are excluded from the un-denoised set. The above
procedures are repeated until all pixels are denoised.
The proposed heuristic algorithm is distributive, and only locally neighboring
information is required for finding the coalition. Moreover, since it is not an iterative
algorithm, there is no convergence issue. Compared with the merge and split rules
[15], the computation complexity is greatly reduced since the split process is avoided.
From the experimental results shown in Section 6.5, we can see that the proposed
heuristic algorithm performs quite well.
Algorithm 6 A Heuristic Algorithm For Coalition Formation
Initialization: let the set of denoised pixel SD = ∅ and its complement S̄D = Φ, let N1 = 800,
N2 = 21× 21, and i = 0.
While S̄D 6= ∅
• i = i + 1
• randomly choose k ∈ S̄D, let Φ0 = {k} and set j = N1
• While j > 0
– j = j − 1





– set Φ0 = Φ0 ∪ {l?}





• let n?i = arg maxn u(n), Φi = Φ0(1 : n?i )
• compute m?i = arg min
1≤m≤N2
SURE (Φi,m)
• set S̄D = S̄D \ Φi and SD = SD ∪ Φi
• denoise the pixel in Φi using (6.4) with m = m?i
End
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6.4 Relation to the Traditional Approaches
In the traditional pixel-domain image denoising approaches, every pixel is de-
noised using (6.2) with a heuristically pre-defined candidate set S(k). For example,
a fixed-size square window centered by the target pixel k is chosen as the candidate
set in the nonlocal image denoising method [20]. Such kinds of approaches have a
performance limitation due to the self-constrained use of a pre-defined candidate
set. As shown in Figs. 6.1 and 6.2, we can see that the candidate set should be
adaptively chosen for different neighborhoods and/or noise variances. Moreover, we
will show in the following analysis that the traditional methods such as the nonlocal
method [20] is actually a special case of the proposed game theoretical framework
by choosing a utility function without a cost term
U(Φi) = g(|Φi|, σ2). (6.23)
According to the discussion in Section 6.3.3, we know that a valid gain function
g(|Φi|, σ2) should be monotonically increasing, concave, and superadditive in terms
of |Φi|. In such a case, if the utility function only involves the gain function as
in (6.23), then all pixels will form a grand coalition and use the same candidate
set. In such a case, it return to the traditional ad-hoc approaches where a fixed
candidate set is used for all pixels. In this sense, we can say that the traditional
ad-hoc approaches are special cases of the proposed game theoretical framework.
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6.5 Experimental Results
We evaluate the proposed game theoretical image denoising approach by com-
paring it with the nonlocal method [20]. Four 512× 512 images shown in Fig. 6.6:
Lena, Barbara, Boat and Flinstones, are tested. The neighborhood B and the pa-
rameter h in (6.6) are set to be 11× 11 and 10σ respectively. The candidate set for
the nonlocal method is set to be a 21 × 21 square window. The parameter λ1 for
the proposed method in the gain function in (6.20) is set to be 0.875. Note that this
parameter λ1 is fixed for all four tested images.
We first examine the candidate set generated by the proposed approach. In
Figs. 6.1 and 6.2, we show the ideally optimal candidate sets of two different image
patches by assuming the original signal is available. Obviously, due to the absence
of the original signal, we are not able to get the ideally optimal candidate sets.
Nevertheless, with the proposed game theoretical approach and the SURE estimate,
we can find approximate candidate sets and the results are shown in Figs. 6.7 and
6.8. From Figs. 6.7 and 6.8, we can see that the approximate candidate sets are
much more similar to the ideally optimal candidate sets compared with the fixed
square window candidate set used by [20].
Then, we evaluate the PSNR comparison versus the standard derivation of
the noise. The PSNR comparison between the nonlocal method and the proposed
method for the tested images at different noise levels are shown in Fig. 6.9. From
Fig. 6.9, we can see that the proposed method always performs better than, if not
equal to, the nonlocal method for all tested images at all different noise variances.
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When the standard deviation of the noise is no larger than 20, i.e. σ ≤ 20, the
PSNR performance of the proposed approach is just a bit better than the nonlocal
method. This is because when σ is small, the weights of the pixels outside the
optimal candidate set are too small. In such a case, the reconstruction using a
heuristically determined square window candidate set is similar to that using an
optimal candidate set, i.e., the performance of the nonlocal method is similar to the
performance of the proposed approach when σ is small. However, we should notice
that the performance of the nonlocal method is always upper bounded by that of the
proposed method since the adaptively chosen candidate set is always better than, if
not equal to, the fixed square window candidate set.
When σ becomes larger, the superiority of the proposed approach becomes
more significant. This phenomenon is mainly because when σ is large, the weights of
the pixels outside the optimal candidate is relatively large and is no longer negligible.
In such a case, the reconstruction using all pixels in a heuristically determined
square window tends to lead to over-smooth artifacts. On the other hand, since
the candidate set is adaptively chosen for every pixel in the proposed method, we
are able to preserve details of the original image and avoid over-smooth artifacts.
From Fig. 6.9, we can see that the gain of the proposed approach over the nonlocal
method can be up to 2.16dB for the Flinestones image when σ = 60, which fully
demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Finally, we evaluate the visual quality of the reconstructions. In Fig. 6.10,
we show the visual quality comparison for Flinstones. As shown in Fig. 6.10, (a) is
the original patch of Flinstones and (b) is the noisy patch with σ = 25. The results
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generated by the nonlocal method and the proposed approach are shown in (c) and
(d) respectively. We can see that the result generated by the nonlocal method is
over-smooth. This phenomenon is because the nonlocal method involves too many
dis-similar pixels in the averaging process. With the proposed approach, every pixel
(player) seeks parters to form coalition to determine the best number of neighbor-
hoods to perform denoising, which can rule out the dis-similar neighborhoods and
avoid over-smooth artifacts. Therefore, the details can be well-preserved in the pro-
posed approach. Similar phenomenons can be observed in Figs. 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13
for Barbara, Lena and Boat at noise level σ = 35, σ = 45, and σ = 20 respectively.
Due to the page limitation, we only show the results of one σ for each image in this
chapter. Similar results are observed for different σ′s.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we study the trade-off between the accuracy of the Stein’s esti-
mate and the minimum of the true MSE and formulate the image denoising problem
as a coalition formation game. With the proposed game, every player (pixel) seek
parters to form coalitions to obtain better decision for the optimal neighborhoods se-
lection and thus lead to better denoising results. The experimental results show that
compared with the nonlocal method [20], the proposed game theoretical approach
can achieve not only better PSNR performance but also better visual quality. Note
that the proposed game is also applicable in other scenarios besides the nonlocal
method as long as 1) there exist some locally adaptive parameters to be estimated,
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and 2) the estimation accuracy will be improved when more samples are involved
in the estimate process. Moreover, we showed that the traditional approaches using
a heuristically determined candidate set are special cases of the game theoretical
framework by choosing the utility function without a cost term.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
(i) (j) (k)
Figure 6.7: An example of optimal candidate set with an edge region: (a) original
image; (b) noisy image with σ = 15; (c) noisy image with σ = 25; (d) noisy image
with σ = 35; (e) the candidate set used by nonlocal; (f) (g) and (h) are the ideally
optimal candidate sets of (b) (c) and (d) when the original signal is available; (i) (j)
and (k) are the candidate sets of (b) (c) and (d) generated by the proposed method.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
(i) (j) (k)
Figure 6.8: An example of optimal candidate set with a smooth region: (a) original
image; (b) noisy image with σ = 15; (c) noisy image with σ = 25; (d) noisy image
with σ = 35; (e) the candidate set used by nonlocal; (f) (g) and (h) are the ideally
optimal candidate sets of (b) (c) and (d) when the original signal is available; (i) (j)
and (k) are the candidate sets of (b) (c) and (d) generated by the proposed method.
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Figure 6.10: The visual quality comparison for Flinstones with σ = 25: (a) original
image; (b) noisy image; (c) the result generated by the nonlocal method; (d) the




Figure 6.11: The visual quality comparison for Barbara with σ = 35: (a) original
image; (b) noisy image; (c) the result generated by the nonlocal method; (d) the




Figure 6.12: The visual quality comparison for Lena with σ = 45: (a) original
image; (b) noisy image; (c) the result generated by the nonlocal method; (d) the




Figure 6.13: The visual quality comparison for Boat with σ = 20: (a) original
image; (b) noisy image; (c) the result generated by the nonlocal method; (d) the
result generated by the proposed approach.
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Chapter 7
Simultaneous Image Denoising and Interpolation Using Evolutionary
Games
Spatial resolution up-conversion is one of the most important tasks in the field
of image processing. Image interpolation is the technique addressing the problem
of spatial resolution up-conversion. It generates a high resolution image from the
input low resolution image by exploiting the inherent relationship between them.
The commonly used image interpolation methods are the conventional linear
interpolation schemes such as bilinear and bicubic interpolation [75]. These methods
generate the high resolution image using a spatial-invariant linear interpolation filter.
Although the computational complexity is low, these methods are not favored since
they introduce a lot of blurring and ringing artifacts.
To overcome the drawbacks of conventional linear interpolation schemes, many
more sophisticated adaptive image interpolation methods have been proposed. Jensen
and Anastassiou proposed to first detect edges and then fit them with some tem-
plates to improve the interpolation result [69], while Carrato and Tenze optimized
the interpolation parameters by using some predetermined edge pattern [24]. In [13],
Allebach and Wong proposed to first estimate the high resolution edge map from
the low resolution image using a subpixel edge estimation technique, and then cor-
rect the interpolated high resolution pixels based on the high resolution edge map.
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Based on the assumption that the covariance matrix of the high resolution image
can be well estimated from the covariance matrix of the low resolution image, Li
and Orchard proposed an edge-preserved interpolation scheme [82]. Cha and Kim
in [25] proposed a modified bilinear method by amending the error based on the
interpolation error theorem in an edge-adaptive way. In [81], an MRF model-based
edge-directed interpolation method is proposed by formulating the image interpola-
tion problem as an energy minimization problem over a 2-D Markov Random field,
where the edge direction information generated by a statistical based approach is
incorporated in the energy function. For better interpolation, Zhang and Wu pro-
posed to first generate multiple reconstructions from different directions, and then
fuse the results by minimum mean square error estimation [132]. To further improve
the interpolation results, a soft-decision adaptive interpolation (SAI) technique is
proposed in [135] by combining the piecewise 2-D autoregressive modeling and block
estimation.
Although the existing approaches can achieve promising interpolation results,
they are designed for the noisy-free images, i.e., clean images. However, if the low
resolution image is noisy, most of the existing interpolation approaches will also
boost the noise and introduces severe visual distortions such as fake edge artifacts
shown in Figure 7.1. In reality, due to the quality of the sensors or the conditions of
the environment, sensor noise is introduced during the image acquisition processes.
Moreover, additional noise and distortions will be introduced during the processes
of being digitized, recorded, and transmitted. To avoid the distortion caused by the
undesired noise boosting, one may perform the denoising before the interpolation.
152
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7.1: (a) a region of Lena image that is corrupted with Gaussian noise with
noise variance σ2 = 25; (b) the interpolation result using bicubic; (c) the interpola-
tion result using SAI.
Many image denoising approaches have been proposed in the literature by exploiting
the inherently spatial correlation. For examples, Woods and Radewan [126] proposed
to estimate the original image from the noisy image by using Kalman filter while
Jin [70] proposed to use adaptive Wiener filter. To further exploit the spatial cor-
relation, Buades [20] proposed to average, in a weighted manner, all the pixels in a
nonlocal window instead of only involving the locally neighboring pixels. For better
reconstruction, the authors in [33] propose a game theoretic approach to adaptively
choose the optimal neighborhood. Nonlinear approaches such as diffusion [55], total
variation [56], rate distortion optimization [32], and fuzzy filtering [120] were also
investigated. Besides the pixel-domain approaches, transform-domain approaches
such as wavelet shrinkage [50] [45] were also investigated.
Nevertheless, as shown later in Section 7.2.1., since the denoising problem it-
self is ill-posed, the methods that first perform denoising and then interpolate the
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denoising image can in adversely introduce severe visual artifacts. Therefore, to
achieve better results, it is very important for us to jointly consider image denois-
ing and interpolation together. In the literature, there are some prior works on
jointly perform denoising and demosaicking – a special case of interpolation that
reconstructs the missing color component due to color-filtered image sensors. For
example, the authors in [67] proposed to use total least square technique, while the
authors in [79] proposed to combine directional filter with wavelet-based denoising
method. However, since these approaches are specially designed for demosaicking,
they cannot be directly applied into the general interpolation problem.
The essential problem of simultaneous denoising and interpolation is to es-
timate the unknown clean pixels in the high resolution image based on the low
resolution noisy image by exploiting the inherent relationship between them, e.g.,
estimating the unknown high resolution pixels using weighted average of a set of
neighboring low resolution noisy pixels. However, since the original high resolution
pixels are unknown, the optimal weights are not achievable. Most of the existing in-
terpolation approaches find the approximated weights based on the assumption that
the covariance matrix of the high resolution image can be well-estimated from the co-
variance matrix of the low resolution image [82]. Nevertheless, when this assumption
is not true, the interpolation performance will be greatly degraded. Moreover, since
the low resolution image is corrupted by noise, the reconstruction performance can
be further degraded. Here, instead of directly estimating the weights in one step, we
propose to progressively refine the weights by alternatively estimating the weights
based on the reconstruction and finding the reconstruction using the weights. Such
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a refinement process of the weights is actually an evolutionary process and can be
naturally formulated as an evolutionary game. Thus, in this chapter, we consider
the problem of simultaneous denoising and interpolation from the game theoretic
perspective and formulate the problem as an evolutionary game.
Evolutionary game theory is an application of the mathematical theory of
games to the interaction dependent strategy evolution in populations. Arising from
the realization that frequency dependent fitness introduces a strategic aspect to evo-
lution, evolutionary game theory becomes an essential component of a mathematical
and computational approach to biological contexts, such as genes, viruses, cells, and
humans. There are three basic components in an evolutionary game: players, strate-
gies, and payoff functions. Players are the entities who play the game. Strategies,
which can be divided into pure strategies and mixed strategies, are the complete
plans of actions players may take in the game. A pure strategy is a deterministic
plan of how a player will play a game while a mixed strategy is an assignment of
a probability to each pure strategy. Payoff functions determine the payoffs players
can obtain by adopting a certain strategy. In the proposed evolutionary game for
simultaneous image denoising and interpolation, the players are the unknown high
resolution pixels, and their pure strategies are the neighboring low resolution noisy
pixels. The probabilities in the mixed strategy are the non-negative normalized
weights of the low resolution noisy pixels. In this sense, the simultaneous image
denoising and interpolation problem is no longer ill-posed. Instead, the problem
becomes well-defined, and the objective of the player is to find the evolutionarily
stable strategy, i.e., the optimal combination of the low resolution noisy pixels, to
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achieve better denoising or interpolation performance.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We first give an introduction
about evolutionary game model in Section 7.1. Then, we show the problems of the
methods that first perform denoising and then interpolate the denoising image, and
describe in details how to formulate the problem of simultaneous image denoising
and interpolation as an evolutionary game, how to choose the pure strategy set and
how to define the payoff function in Section 7.2. Experimental results are shown in
Section 7.3. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 7.4.
7.1 Evolutionary Game Model
Before discussing how to use evolutionary game to simultaneously perform
denoising and interpolation, in this section, we first briefly give an introduction
about evolutionary games. A game G = {U, A, F} is generally defined as follows.
U = {u1, u2, ..., uN} are the players who play the game. A = A1 × A2 × ... × AN
are the pure strategy sets, where Ai is the pure strategy set containing all possible
pure strategies for user ui. Let ai ∈ Ai be one possible strategy for ui, then a =
(a1, a2, ..., aN) ∈ A is a strategy profile of U. F = {f1, f2, ..., fN} are the players’
payoff/utility functions, where fi is the payoff function of ui. In general, fi is
determined by all players’ strategies a rather than ai only, i.e., fi = fi(a). Also,
a−i = (a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., aN) denotes the players’ strategy profile except player
ui. Besides pure strategies, players can also take a mixed strategy by randomizing
among different pure strategies. Suppose there are Mi pure strategies in the pure
156
strategy set Ai = {a1i , ..., aMii }, and let pij, j = 1, ...,Mi be the probability of ui
choosing the jth pure strategy aji , then pi = (pi1, ..., piMi) is a mixed strategy.
Since the payoff function fi is generally not only determined by ai but also by
a−i, to maximize the payoff, every player needs to know all other players’ strategies.
However, it is generally very difficult or even impossible for players to know other
player strategies and payoffs. In such a case, to improve their payoffs, players
will try different strategies in every play and learn from the strategic interactions
using the methodology of understanding-by-building, which leads to the concept of
“Evolutionary Game” [34] [110].
An evolutionary game is a game that studies the evolution of the interaction
dependent strategy in populations, and was first articulated by John Maynard Smith
and G. R. Price for evolutionary biology. It is based on the idea that an organism’s
genes largely determine its fitness in a given environment. Organisms that are more
fit to the environment will tend to produce more offspring, due to which genes
that provide greater fitness have more representation in the population. Therefore,
fitter genes tend to win over time and drive out other genes. If we treat organisms
as players and genes as strategies, then the genes which persist in the population
are the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of an evolutionary game, which can be
formally defined as “a strategy such that, if all members of the population adopt it,
then no mutant strategy could invade the population under the influence of natural
selection”. The evolution of the strategies over the population by natural selection
can be characterized by the Wright-Fisher model [54], which is by far the most



















Figure 7.2: (a) Denoising before interpolation; (b) Simultaneous denoising and in-
terpolation.
the assumption that the probability of an individual adopting a certain strategy is
proportional to the expected payoff of the population using that strategy, and the






























i , a−i) is the total expected payoff of ui using different





7.2 Image Denosing and Interpolation as an Evolutionary Game
7.2.1 Problems of Denoising+Interpolation
As discussed in the introduction, when the input low resolution image is noisy,
most of the existing interpolation approaches will also boost the noise and introduces
severe visual distortions. To avoid such kinds of distortions, one may consider
performing the denoising before the interpolation as shown in Figure 7.2 (a). The
noisy low resolution image Inl is first passed through a denoising process and an




Figure 7.3: (a) a region of Lena image that is corrupted by Gaussian noise with noise
variance σ2 = 225; (b) the denoised result using nonlocal; (c) the interpolation result
of (b) using bicubic; (d) the interpolation result of (b) using SAI.
resolution image Îl goes through a interpolation process and a reconstruction of
the original high resolution image Îh is obtained. Nevertheless, since the denoising
problem itself is ill-posed [20], the low resolution estimate Îl is not perfect and there
will be some differences between the estimate Îl and the original Il. On one hand,
the edge structures and textures may be removed during the denoising process,
e.g., the details of the hair shown in Figure 7.3 (b). On the other hand, some
noise may not be efficiently suppressed during the denoising process, e.g., the region
around the nose and mouth shown in Figure 7.3 (b). In such a case, if we directly
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perform interpolation on Îl, the lost edge structures and textures will never be
reconstructed back and the remained noise will be boosted which introducing severe
visual distortions such as fake edge artifacts as shown in Figure 7.3 (c) and (d).
Therefore, we should jointly consider image denoising and interpolation to achieve
better reconstruction as illustrated in Figure 7.2 (b).
7.2.2 Game Theoretic Formulation
In this simultaneous denoising and interpolation problem, we have the noisy
observation of the low resolution pixels, Inl (m,n), 1 ≤ m ≤ NH , 1 ≤ n ≤ MW .
The objective of this problem is to estimate the high resolution image Ih(i, j), 1 ≤
i ≤ 2 × NH , 1 ≤ j ≤ 2 × MW based on the noisy low resolution image Inl (n, m).
Obviously, this problem is ill-posed. To find a good estimate for the unknown
high resolution pixels, we need to exploit the correlation among the low resolution
pixels and between the low resolution pixels and the high resolution pixels. One
possible approach is to use the spatially varying linear filter, i.e., each unknown
high resolution pixel can be estimated using weighted average of a set of neighboring






l (m,n), ∀i,∀j, (7.2)
where Ωij is the candidate set of neighboring noisy low resolution pixels for Ih(i, j)
and wijmn is the weight of candidate pixel I
n
l (m,n). Usually, we have the constraints





Obviously, the optimal weights in (7.2) are not achievable since the original
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high resolution pixels are unknown. Most of the existing approaches find the ap-
proximated weights based on the assumption that the covariance matrix of the high
resolution image can be well-estimated from the covariance matrix of the low res-
olution image [82]. However, when this assumption is not true, the denoising and
interpolation performance will be greatly degraded. Here, instead of directly esti-
mating the weights in one step, we propose to progressively refine the weights by
alternatively estimating the weights based on the reconstruction and finding the
reconstruction using the weights. Such a refinement process of the weights is ac-
tually an evolutionary process and can be naturally formulated as an evolutionary
game [110]. In the proposed evolutionary game for image denoising and interpola-
tion, the players are the unknown high resolution pixels to be estimated and the
pure strategies are the correspondingly neighboring noisy low resolution pixels. By
regarding the non-negative weights of the neighboring noisy low resolution pixels
as the probabilities of selecting the pure strategies, the problem of estimating the
high resolution pixels becomes finding the evolutionarily stable strategies for the
evolutionary game. In this sense, the simultaneous image denoising and interpola-
tion problem is no longer ill-posed. Instead, the problem becomes well-defined, and
the objective of the problem is to find the evolutionarily stable strategies to achieve
good denoising and interpolation performance.
In summary, the estimation problem in (7.2) can be formulated as an evolu-
tionary game as follows.
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Figure 7.4: The pure strategy set Ωij for Ih(2m−1, 2n−1), Ih(2m−1, 2n), Ih(2m, 2n−
1), Ih(2m, 2n).
• Pure strategies: noisy low resolution pixels Inl (m,n)
• Pure strategy set: the candidate set Ωij
• Mixed strategy: the estimate Îh(i, j)
• Probabilities in the mixed strategy: the non-negative normalized weights wijmn
7.2.3 Pure Strategy Set Ωij
In most of the previous interpolation approaches, the high resolution image is
reconstructed in two steps: in the first step, the unknown high resolution pixels sur-
rounded by four low resolution pixels, i.e., Ih(2m, 2n); and in the second step, other
unknown high resolution pixels Ih(2m− 1, 2n) and Ih(2m, 2n− 1) are reconstructed
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with the help of reconstructed high resolution pixels Ih(2n, 2m). Different from pre-
vious approaches, in our game theoretic framework, pixels are treated as players and
they have the same priority. The pure strategy set Ωij is the same for all four high
resolution pixels Ih(2m−1, 2n−1), Ih(2m−1, 2n), Ih(2m, 2n−1), Ih(2m, 2n) and is
defined as a square window centered by Ih(2m− 1, 2n− 1) in Figure 7.4. As shown
in Figure 7.4, the red circle stands for pixel Ih(2m− 1, 2n− 1) and the three green
squares stand for pixels Ih(2m− 1, 2n), Ih(2m, 2n− 1), and Ih(2m, 2n) respectively.
The gray square window centered by Ih(2m− 1, 2n− 1), denoted as Ωij, is the pure
strategy set for Ih(2m− 1, 2n− 1), Ih(2m− 1, 2n), Ih(2m, 2n− 1), and Ih(2m, 2n).
7.2.4 Payoff Function
After choosing the pure strategy set, we now discuss how to define the payoff
function. The payoff function f tij(aij, a−ij) measures the player’s payoff of taking
strategy aij when other players’ strategies are a−ij at time t. Let Î th stand for the
estimate of the high resolution image Ih at time t, and B(Î
t
h(i, j)) stand for the
patch centered by Î th(i, j). The neighborhood similarity between pixel Î
t
h(i, j) and
Î th(m,n) at time t can be measured by D
t(Î th(i, j) ↔ Î th(m, n)) as follows
Dt(Î th(i, j) ↔ Î th(m,n)) = ||B(Î th(i, j))−B(Î th(m,n))||2. (7.3)
Moreover, let us define D̄t−1(Îh(i, j) ↔ Îh(m,n)) as the weighted average of
the neighborhood similarity up to time t− 1 as follow
D̄t−1(Îh(i, j) ↔ Îh(m,n)) =
∑t−1
k=0 β





where β is a discounting factor, and when β = 1, D̄t−1(Îh(i, j) ↔ Îh(m,n)) reduces
to the simple averaging.
Note that D̄t−1(Îh(i, j) ↔ Îh(m,n)) can be treated as an estimate of D(Ih(i, j) ↔
Ih(m,n)) at time t−1 by taking into account all previous reconstruction Î0h, ..., Î t−1h ,
and Dt(Î th(i, j) ↔ Î th(m, n)) is an estimate of D(Ih(i, j) ↔ Ih(m,n)) at time t us-
ing the reconstruction Î th. If Î
t
h(i, j) is a good estimate, D
t(Î th(i, j) ↔ Î th(m, n))
tends to be close to D̄t−1(Îh(i, j) ↔ Îh(m,n)). If Dt(Î th(i, j) ↔ Î th(m,n)) <
D̄t−1(Îh(i, j) ↔ Îh(m,n)), the neighborhood similarity between pixel Îh(i, j) and
Îh(m,n) is larger than what we anticipate at time t− 1, which means that a larger
payoff should be received by adopting strategy Î th(m,n) at time t. On the other
hand if Dt(Î th(i, j) ↔ Î th(m,n)) > D̄t−1(Îh(i, j) ↔ Îh(m,n)), the neighborhood sim-
ilarity between pixel Îh(i, j) and Îh(m,n) is smaller than what we anticipate at time
t − 1, which means that a smaller payoff should be received by adopting strategy
Î th(m,n) at time t. Therefore, the payoff function should be an increasing function
of (D̄t−1(Îh(i, j) ↔ Îh(m,n) −Dt(Î th(i, j) ↔ Î th(m,n))). Here, we use the following
payoff function









where αt and γ are parameters.
Interestingly, if we set αt =
βt∑t
k=0 β
k and substitute (7.5) back into (7.1), the





















Figure 7.5: The block diagram of the proposed method.
where D̄t(Îh(i, j) ↔ Îh(m, n)) is defined as
D̄t(Îh(i, j) ↔ Îh(m,n)) =
∑t
k=0 β




The (7.6) can be interpreted as follows: the true similarity between Ih(i, j) and
aij is approximately measured by D̄
t(Îh(i, j) ↔ aij), and the larger D̄t(Îh(i, j) ↔
aij), the less the similarity; therefore, the pixels with smaller D̄
t(Îh(i, j) ↔ aij)
should make more contribution during the denoising and interpolation process, i.e.,
the probability of choosing aij should be a decreasing function of D̄
t(Îh(i, j) ↔ aij),
and here we use an exponential function.
According to the above discussions, the proposed simultaneous image denoising
and interpolation using evolutionary games can be summarized as in Figure 7.5. As
shown in Figure 7.5, the noisy low resolution image Inl is first interpolated using
Bicubic [75] to obtain a noisy estimate of the high resolution image Î0h. Then, at
each evolution time index t, we compute the neighborhood similarity Dt(Î th(i, j) ↔
Î th(m,n)) using (7.3). Then, the probability of using a certain pure strategy aij can
be updated using (7.6) and (7.7). Finally, the estimate of the high resolution image
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at time index t + 1 can be found as follows






Note that the outcome of the proposed game theoretic algorithm is an evo-
lutionarily stable strategy, and the proof can be found in the following Theorem
1.
Theorem 1: For any β ∈ [0, 1), the outcome of the proposed game theoretic
algorithm shown in Figure 7.5 is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
Proof : Since β ∈ [0, 1), βk goes to zero as k goes to infinite. According to
(7.7), D̄t(Îh(i, j) ↔ Îh(m,n)) converges for sufficiently large t. Therefore, according
to (7.6), pt+1aij converges for sufficiently large t, which means that the probability
distribution of using the pure strategies pij = (p1, ..., p|Ωij |) converges. Since such a
strategy is chosen under the influence of Wright-Fisher natural selection model [54],
according to the definition of ESS, the strategy is an ESS.
7.3 Experimental Results
To evaluate the proposed game theoretic approach for simultaneous image de-
noising and interpolation, we compare with the methods that first perform denoising
using nonlocal [20] and then perform interpolation using either bicubic method [75]
or the soft-decision adaptive interpolation (SAI) method [135], which are denoted as
“Nonlocal+Bicubic” and “Nonlocal+SAI”. Five images shown in Figure 7.6:
Lena, Boat, Kodim03, Kodim07, and Kodim09, are tested. For convenience, all
tested image are truncated to 512x512. The noisy low resolution images are gen-
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erated by first adding additive white Gaussian noise to the high resolution images
and then directly perform downsample.
We first evaluate the PSNR performance for different approaches. In Figure
7.7, we show the PSNR comparison among Nonlocal+Bicubic, Nonlocal+SAI and
the proposed method. We can see that the proposed method outperforms both
Nonlocal+Bicubic and Nonlocal+SAI when σ ≥ 10, and the gain becomes larger
and larger as σ increases. We can also see that as σ increases, the advantage of
using SAI diminishes. This is mainly because too many details are removed during
the denoising process when σ is high. This phenomenon fully demonstrates the
importance of performing joint denoising and interpolation. When 5 < σ < 10,
the PSNR performance of the proposed method is similar to that of Nonlocal+SAI
(the proposed method has slightly better performance for Lena and Kodim03, and
slightly worse performance for Boat and Kodim09). However, both the proposed
method and Nonlocal+SAI are better than Nonlocal+Bicubic. When σ ≤ 5, the
proposed method performs slightly worse than Nonlocal+SAI. This is mainly be-
cause the proposed method not only removes the additive noise but also removes the
sensor noise in the original image, and the PSNR is computed based on the original
images which contains some sensor noise. Nevertheless, the proposed method can
achieve much better visual quality even in the low σ region as shown in Figure 7.9.
We also evaluate the visual quality performance and show the visual quality
comparison in Figures 7.8, 7.9, 7.10, 7.11, and 7.12, respectively, for different images
at different noise variances. The results for Lena image are shown in Figure 7.8,
where (a) is the noisy low resolution Lena image with σ = 10, (b) is the result
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generated by Nonlocal+Bicubic with PSNR 30.71dB, (c) is the result generated by
Nonlocal+SAI method with PSNR 31.11dB, and (d) is the result generated by the
proposed method with PSNR 31.38dB. By comparing (b) (c) and (d) in Figure 7.8,
we can see that both Nonlocal+Bicubic and Nonlocal+SAI cannot well suppress
noise in the edge and texture regions and introduce some visually annoying artifacts
such as fake edge artifacts in the face region. Since the proposed game theoretic
method can simultaneously perform denoising and interpolation, we can avoid the
artifacts caused by the separation of denoising and interpolation and generate the
reconstruction with much better performance in terms of both PSNR and visual
quality.
Moreover, the proposed method has the ability to automatically remove the
visually annoying sensor noise. In Figure 7.9, we show the reconstructed results
for Boat image. Note that the original Boat image contains some sensor noise es-
pecially in the sky region as shown in Figure 7.6 (b). In Figure 7.9, (a) is the
noisy low resolution Boat image with σ = 5, (b) is the result generated by Non-
local+Bicubic with PSNR 28.52dB, (c) is the result generated by Nonlocal+SAI
method with PSNR 28.92dB, and (d) is the result generated by the proposed method
with PSNR 28.74dB. By comparing (b) (c) and (d) in Figure 7.9, we can see that
the proposed method automatically removes the sensor noise in the sky region while
Nonlocal+SAI and Nonlocal+Bicubic cannot. In such a case, although the proposed
method has a lower PSNR performance compared with Nonlocal+SAI, the visual
quality of the result generated by the proposed method is still much better than
that of Nonlocal+SAI.
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The visual quality of the reconstructions of Kodim07, Kodim09 and Kodim03
are also evaluated at noise level σ = 10, σ = 15, and σ = 20 in Figures 7.10,
7.11, and 7.12, respectively. Similar to previous experiments, the proposed method
can greatly suppress the noise and restore the image with not only better PSNR
performance but also better visual quality, especially in the regions around edges
and textures.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated the problem of simultaneous image denoising
and interpolation from a completely new angle: game theoretic perspective. We
treat each unknown high resolution pixel as an individual player and formulate the
joint image denoising and interpolation problem as an evolutionary game. From
such a perspective, the problem of estimating the high resolution pixels becomes
finding the evolutionarily stable strategies for the evolutionary game. The exper-
imental results show that compared with the methods that first denoise the noisy
low resolution image and then interpolate the denoised image, the proposed game






Figure 7.6: The test images: (a) Lena; (b) Boat; (c) Kodim03; (d) Kodim07; (e)
Kodim09.
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Figure 7.8: The visual quality comparison for Lena: (a) the noisy low resolution
image with σ = 10; (b) the result generated by Nonlocal+Bicubic (30.71dB); (c)
the result generated by Nonlocal+SAI method (31.11dB); (d) the result generated




Figure 7.9: The visual quality comparison for Boat: (a) the noisy low resolution
image with σ = 5; (b) the result generated by Nonlocal+Bicubic (28.52dB); (c) the
result generated by Nonlocal+SAI method (28.92dB); (d) the result generated by




Figure 7.10: The visual quality comparison for Kodim07: (a) the noisy low resolution
image with σ = 10; (b) the result generated by Nonlocal+Bicubic (29.85dB); (c)
the result generated by Nonlocal+SAI method (30.18dB); (d) the result generated




Figure 7.11: The visual quality comparison for Kodim09: (a) the noisy low resolution
image with σ = 15; (b) the result generated by Nonlocal+Bicubic (29.56dB); (c)
the result generated by Nonlocal+SAI method (29.81dB); (d) the result generated




Figure 7.12: The visual quality comparison for Kodim03: (a) the noisy low resolution
image with σ = 20; (b) the result generated by Nonlocal+Bicubic (27.85dB); (c)
the result generated by Nonlocal+SAI method (28.03dB); (d) the result generated
by the proposed method (28.37dB).
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we develop a game-theoretic framework that enables us to first
analyze and model human behaviors in multimedia social networks, and then better
design the multimedia systems by taking into account the impact of human factors.
We have showed that understanding the human behaviors and dynamics in a mul-
timedia social network can ultimately offer better system performance and thus is
essential for its continued progress, and such analysis and modeling can be applied
to any social networks.
Moreover, we extend the concept of multimedia social networking into classical
signal/image processing problems to liberate pixels/signals as players to develop
a game-theoretic framework that can, not only overcome some of the undesired
ill-posed formulations in traditional approaches, but also obtain a more general
paradigm beyond what can be accomplished by using traditional optimization tools.
With the notion of learning and cognitive process inherent in a game theoretic
formulation, we show that many classical approaches are basically special cases of
the proposed game-theoretic framework. Therefore, the proposed framework offers
new directions, insight, and methodologies in further advancing of the science of
signal/image processing.
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The broader impact of this thesis is
1. Social networks have pervaded our daily life. By illustrating that game theory
can be used to understand human behavior and dynamics in a multimedia
social network with better system performance, this thesis can motivate similar
new ideas in many social networks.
2. Signal and image processing has been a fundamental tool in many scientific
and engineering disciplines. By introducing the proposed new game-theoretic
paradigm to classical signal/image problems with new insight and significant
performance improvement, this thesis can trigger similar new thinking to many
scientific areas that use signal/image processing.
Specifically, in Chapter 3, we consider a non-cooperative multimedia social
network and discuss how a group of users compete for the same resource. We use
multiuser rate allocation social network as an example and show that game the-
ory can provide a more general framework by theoretically proving that the tradi-
tional optimization-based approach is a special case of the proposed game theoretical
framework. Moreover, with the proposed method, we can find, in a distributed man-
ner, a NE that is not only efficient from system designer’s perspective but also fair
from users’ perspective. Then, in Chapter 4, we consider a cooperative multimedia
social network and discuss how a group of selfish users cooperate with each other to
better obtain the content. We use cooperative peer-to-peer streaming social network
as an example and show that evolutionary game can be used in such a scenario and
ESS is the desired cooperative strategy. Moreover, we propose a distributed learn-
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ing algorithm for users to converge to the ESS by learning from their own payoff
history. In Chapter 5, we discuss how to stimulate cooperation in cooperative social
networks. We first show that most of the existing game theoretic cooperation stim-
ulation approaches fail when the number of interaction between a pair of players is
finite, and the major reason is the use of direct reciprocity. Then, we propose to
use indirect reciprocity games to stimulate cooperation in such a scenario by taking
into account the indirect opinions. With such a modeling, we show with simulations
that an evolutionarily stable cooperative strategy can be achieved with a proper
cost-to-gain ratio. In Chapter 6, the image denoising problem is formulated as a
coalition formation game, where every pixel is treated as a player who tries to seek
partners to form a coalition to find the optimal neighborhoods for better denoising
results. By forming a coalition, every player in the coalition can obtain certain gains
by improving the accuracy of the distortion estimation, while incurring some costs
by increasing the true distortion. With such a formulation, the traditional image
denoising approaches using a heuristically determined neighborhood set can be seen
as special cases of the proposed game theoretical framework by choosing the utility
function without a cost term. Another example is formulating the problem of si-
multaneous image denoising and interpolation as an evolutionary game in Chapter
7, where the players are the unknown high resolution pixels and the pure strategies
of the players are the corresponding noisy low resolution neighbors. By regarding
the nonnegative weights of the noisy low resolution pixels as the probabilities of
selecting the pure strategies, the problem of estimating the high resolution pixels
becomes finding the evolutionarily stable strategies for the evolutionary game. In
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this sense, we say that the simultaneous image denoising and interpolation problem
is no longer ill-posed. Instead, the problem becomes well-defined, and the objec-
tive of the problem is to find the evolutionarily stable strategies to achieve good
denoising and interpolation performance.
8.2 Future Work
Recently, the area of human and social dynamics has been identified by the
U.S. National Science Foundation as one of its five priority areas, which shows
the importance of this emerging interdisciplinary research area. Game theoretic
modeling for multimedia social networks is a new emerging research field and is
still in an infant stage. There are a lot of exciting problems to be investigated and
addressed, which I will continue to devote my efforts to.
Security in multimedia social networks is one of these problems. Besides self-
ish users, there are a group of users, called malicious users, in multimedia social
networks. Unlike selfish users whose aims are to maximize their own payoffs, the
objective of malicious users is to damage or even break down the system. Therefore,
to successfully deploy the multimedia social networks, we need to study and analyze
the malicious users attack strategies and develop the corresponding attack-resistant
strategies.
With my previous works, we can see that understanding the behavior dy-
namics among users can ultimately offer better system performance. Such analysis
and modeling can be applied to other social networks. Therefore, in the future, I
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would like to investigate the possibility of using such analysis and modeling in other
networks such as online social networks, smart grid networks and camera networks.
In my previous works, I have successfully used the concept of multimedia
social networks to reformulate image denoising and image interpolation problems.
In the future, I would like to apply the concept to more classical problems such
as image/video compression problems, estimation and detection problems, pattern
recognition and classification problems, adaptive signal processing problems, and
information theory related problems. It is our belief that from the multimedia social
networks point of view, we can make the ill-posed problems well defined and are
able to construct generalized and unified frameworks for the classical problems. We
hope that we can introduce a new paradigm not only in the field of signal and image
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